Secession,
Moral Accountability, and Revolution
By Glenn R. Jackson
Copyright 1998 Glenn R.
Jackson
Liberal political philosophy has showcased an increasing
proliferation of right's and entitlement's as the centerpiece of its explanation of how
and why people interact with governments. This is surely a natural outgrowth of the
liberal struggle to make equality the primary moral standard. It is arguable that
equality, as framed by liberal writers, is only supportable by creating just such a broad
range of moral rights. The subject of this paper deals generally with a category of moral
rights that has appeared on the liberal horizon - group moral rights. In particular this
paper will address the group moral right of secession, especially as secession is
presented and argued by Allen Buchanan in Self-determination and the Right to Secede1
and Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and
Quebec.2
In this paper it will be argued that group moral rights are
an unnecessary extension of the moral rights discussion and in particular that secession
as a group moral right is too problematic in its supposed nature to be supported. Also, it
will be argued that secession is not of the moral nature presented by Buchanan, i.e.
secession should not be recognized as a moral right.
The Question of Collective Moral Rights
There are those in liberal circles that argue for secession
as the one sure irreducible collective moral right.3 Angelo Corlett in The Problem of
Collective Moral Rights says, "it is difficult to make sense of the right to
secede on distributivist grounds.''4 But there appear to be two objections that cast
doubts on the plausibility of this claim for secession and, by extension, for the whole
notion of group moral rights.
The first objection deals with how groups exercise their
moral rights, i.e. make moral choices, such as the decision on whether or not to secede.
Inevitably in such cases it is up to individuals to make those choices. It has been argued
that individuals in these cases are acting in the interest of the group - "one
difference between a right the subject of which is an individual and one the subject of
which is a collective is that a collective moral right, unlike an individual one, gives
some member of the collective the power to claim that right for the collective.,,5
Buchanan states that "group rights are ascribed to collections of individuals and can
only be exercised collectively or at least on behalf of the collective...".6
These statements imply that individuals must take a leadership role in exercising
collective moral rights.
Now this is a curious thing. Why would a collective moral
right require an individual to claim that right for the collective? Claiming a right
inevitably leads to exercising the right and thereby making a choice that will have moral
consequences. That individuals can commit a collective to a moral choice is problematic.
It is founded on the troubling idea, advanced by Buchanan for one, that the interests
being served by an individual exercising a collective moral right are each individual's
interests as members of that group.7 This implies that an individual or subset of
individuals can commit the group to a course of action to which each member of the group
has a moral interest and is in moral agreement.
What is to ensure that the few might not be committing the
group to a path which itself may be immoral and deny rights to others? Through what
mechanism do the claiming individuals determine that they are acting on a group right and
in the group interest? It seems just as likely that the few acting for the many could be
seeking their own self interest. As was mentioned above, the individuals claiming the
right for the group are, almost by definition, in leadership roles. That is to say that
there is some individual characteristic about them personally that places them in a
position to be claimors for the group. Historically this can be seen as true. There are
those individuals who are marked by some characteristic of confidence or self-interest
that places them to the forefront of their representative group. This is not to say that
these individuals will not represent their groups well. It is to say that with this
obviously strong individualistic influence it is impossible to say with any
certitude that it is a group moral right being acted upon. An obvious example to structure
this discussion would be Hitler's Germany.
In the lead up to World War II, Hitler used the ethnic
German minorities in many neighboring nations to build secession movements as a pretense
to invasion. Leaders of these movements, whether as willing dupes or puppets, argued for
the moral rights of their respective groups. In each instance there was a ready following
among the minority population. Many participated in activities that furthered a perceived
common interest, but only truly benefited the plans of one man and his closest aides.
Clearly these activities in the end had immoral results, but who acted immorally?
Intuitively it is the leaders that are held accountable for these actions and their
consequences. It would be hard to hold the minority German populations accountable in a
collective moral way for the actions of the few. Condemnation of each member of the group
for the immoral actions of their leaders ignores the distinct possibility of individual
dissent with those actions. The notion of group moral rights ignores the assignment of
accountability to those acting on these supposed group rights. Without individual
involvement in the claiming/exercising of a moral right there is no clear accountability
for immoral actions, and no clear check on the leadership of a group.
The second objection to this view of secession as an
irreducible collective moral right relates to Buchanan's suggestion of a constitutional
right to secede. Secession is claimed as a group moral right, yet it seems to gain the
most strength from an explicit statement of its conditions in a legal document. My
contention is that those who have argued for group moral rights have all along been
substituting legal rights for collective moral rights without recognizing that they - the
legal rights - are distributive to underlying individual moral rights. Individuals have
moral rights. Groups have legal rights established by application of those same individual
moral rights over time.
"Legal relations are merely existing facts of life
viewed in the light of a past uniformity of societal action, that enable us to predict
similar action in the future with respect to two or more persons.''8
Legal relations take individual moral rights and codify them
for application to individuals or groups. I would argue that this idea that group rights
are legal conventions only, gives us a better understanding as to the true nature of these
rights.
As conceded by most advocates of group rights, it takes an
individual to exercise rights for the group. And, as I have already argued, it is doubtful
that these individuals are really acting on a group right, but are more likely acting from
an antecedent individual moral right. Based on that, I would argue that groups are acting
from either an implicit or explicit covenant to be bound by their own intuitively
recognizable individual moral rights. Further I would state that the more formal the group
arrangement the more explicit the covenant.
My understanding of covenant is not, however, the
traditional English use of the word, but is the use as understood in the Greek word Diatheke.
The distinction is between the English binding obligation between two or more
individuals, and the Greek obligation undertaken by a single individual.9 So if I were to
enter the social contract discussion I would not advocate that individuals in a state of
nature, through some figurative handshake, would covenant with each other to form a
rudimentary governing group. Instead, I would argue that each individual covenants with themselves
to be bound by their intuitively known understanding of moral rights in their
relations with others. This is best expounded by the Golden Rule, do unto others as you
would have them do unto you. This eliminates, by necessity, any need to create or
argue for group moral rights.
As groups mature these intuitively understood and
individually held moral rights become less implicit and are developed explicitly in the
rules or laws of the group. Once the explicit social contract reaches a certain stage then
violations of the contract which occur become obvious. There is a clearer understanding of
the violation by each member of the group and concerted action can be taken by the group.
Secession could be viewed as the repudiation of the social contract whereby one sub-group
has reason to assert a claim against the majority group. This puts secession in a position
very much akin to an area of contract law concerned with repudiation, i.e. breach of
contract.
If we take a social contract view of governance or
group/collective involvement, then we can talk of duties. In particular we can talk about
duties that accrue to governments to protect and serve the individual moral and legal
rights of their citizens. Once we talk of rights and duties then we can address those
instances where we witness a non-performance of duty - "a breach of contract is
always a non-performance of duty; but it is not every non-performance of duty that is a
breach of contract."10
Under the American system of contract law it is generally
held that "whenever there is a legal justification for the non-performance of
a promise (duty) there is no breach of contractual duty.''11 An example of a legally
justified non-performance of a duty in a national sphere would be any of the seceding former
Soviet states. It is a clearly recognized legal principle that contracts are not binding
when they are coerced. For example, a union forged at the point of a gun would clearly be
coerced. So the argument would go that there were never binding social contracts between
these former states and the USSR. These once sovereign nations had been forced by a
stronger neighbor into an illegal union. The states have no need to secede, but can simply
walk away from this non-binding union.
It is further held under contract law that "a breach of
contract may be committed by prevention, hindrance or repudiation.''12 An example for this
case of breach of contract would be the American colonies fighting for independence from
Britain. The colonist stated in their Declaration of Independence that they were prevented
from attaining their individual moral rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness. The social contract had been breached by the British Crown and the colonist
felt justified in seeking separation. While this example is arguably not a case of
secession, it nevertheless supports the argument that secession can be addressed as a
legal principle.
I have made a case for the problematic nature of the
argument to support group moral rights. I have argued that legal rights, derived from the
historic patterns of individual moral rights, are a better way to view group moral rights.
And I have given an argument for viewing secession as at most a legal right derived from
antecedent individual moral rights. I will use the remainder of this paper to apply this
understanding to a critical view of Buchanan's arguments about the moral nature of
secession as he has presented them in Secession and Self Determination and the
Right to Secede.
Buchanan and Secession as a Moral Right
Buchanan believes two things about secession: "l)that
it is morally permissible for those who have this right to secede, and
2)that others are morally obligated not to interfere with their seceding.''13 It is
the permissibility and non-interference that gives secession its moral authority and its
status as a moral right. Buchanan develops twelve distinct pro-secession arguments in Secession14,
but only addresses four of those in his following work.15 This I believe is a
concession to the relative strength of the arguments, or as Buchanan himself admits
"among the strongest arguments and most widely applicable arguments for a right to
secede are the argument from rectificatory justice and the argument from discriminatory
redistribution."16 I agree with this assessment and will restrict my discussion to
these two arguments.
Discriminatory Redistribution
"A state engages in discriminatory redistribution
whenever it implements taxation schemes, regulatory policies or economic programs that
systematically work to the disadvantage of some groups while benefiting others, in morally
arbitrary ways."17
In a general way this argument presents the liberal
political position with something of a problem from a consistency point of view. The
liberal welfare state is about redistribution of individual wealth through tax,
regulation, or economic programs. The distinction made by Buchanan between redistribution
which he supports as rightful and redistribution which he supports as grounds for
secession is the moral reasoning consequent to the process of redistribution. For example,
if we review recent changes to the U.S. tax policy and the attending arguments, tax rates
were increased on the top two per cent of the income bracket to ensure overall fairness in
the income distribution in the U.S. tax system, i.e. there was a discrimination made in
the tax policy for a moral reason, to promote fairness.
What if the top two per cent saw a tax increase to fund
project Headstart? What if the top two per cent saw a tax increase to fund the Star Wars
project? Each of these questions addresses something that to some group is morally
justified and to another is morally arbitrary. Buchanan is advocating a litmus test for
the process of redistribution that is consequential to that process. In other words,
Buchanan starts with redistribution as a given good, and only evaluates the consequences
for moral arbitrariness to determine the grounds for secession. But I contend that once
you grant redistribution of individual wealth as morally just, any consequential
justification has itself become morally interchangeable, and arguably arbitrary. Therefore
the discriminatory redistribution litmus test can be used by anyone to support his or her
position. It does not lead to certitude about the moral rightness of secession.
If you have made a moral decision about a process like
redistribution any moral qualifier needed is really about directing the process. By that I
mean, addressing the questions above, educating disadvantaged children and protecting them
from a foreign power can both be argued as a good, but probably not by the same group or
with the same priority. The group that controls the process makes the decision as to what
is arbitrary or not. So, unless Buchanan is arguing that secession is analogous to
children, who finding they are not getting their way in the game take the ball and go
home, then these consequential moral qualifiers can not be moral grounds for secession as
he intends.
The top two percent of Americans receiving the tax increase
in our original example arguably felt discriminated against since they were singled out
and vilified as greedy. They could also make the argument that the truly moral thing to
have done was allow them to invest that money in ways that would benefit the economy to
everyone's advantage. A good argument could be crafted from this example to meet
Buchanan's discriminatory redistribution threshold. Yet no one would seriously support a
two per center's secession. Why? Buchanan would argue that the reason there would be no
support was because the redistribution had been morally just and not arbitrary. I would
argue that the reason no one expects secession is because the redistribution process had
been morally validated subsequent to the tax increase, and the tax increases
themselves are immaterial.
What is material for the two per centers in the example
above, and for historic examples to be explored, is the political system. My argument is
that the political system generates the redistribution process, which then generates
consequences for which Buchanan has provided a litmus test. It is this subsequent
political system that is subject to moral justification. If this system is moral then
individuals living under its governance can feel sure that the system, while not perfect,
is self-correcting. Individual voices and concerns will be heard and actions taken to
correct any morally arbitrary process that is created. The two per centers have no grounds
to secede because they believe the system to still be morally just, perhaps misguided, but
they are accepting of the redistribution process regardless of their opinion as to it's
arbitrary moral consequences.
If we review a couple of historic examples we can see this
argument supported. For example the American South, by my argument, seceded not because of
discriminatory redistribution as Buchanan suggests,18 but because they anticipated that
the system was no longer morally just and self-correcting. Whether correct or not, the
South judged the system to be failing them and decided their course as a nation was best
charted alone.
An even clearer example is the American Revolution. American
school children are taught in their history classes the slogan "No taxation without
representation." What can speak more clearly then that to the underlying issue of an
immoral political system leaving the colonist with no choice save revolution. When a
political system ignores the individuals it governs, its moral authority is questionable.
If you make a social contract argument as I have, then the individual question of is the
covenant made being fulfilled to the individual's good
answers in l~ the negative. If enough individuals have the same negative answer then a
political change is imminent.
Rectificatory Justice
"The most compelling justification for secession may be
called the argument from rectificatory justice...The argument's power stems from the
assumption that secession is simply the reappropriation, by the legitimate owners, of
stolen property. The right to secede, under these circumstances, is just the right to
reclaim what is one's own."19
Rectificatory justification is indeed a compelling argument
for secession, especially in the latter part of the Twentieth century. Part of that
argument's appeal springs from the spectacular break-up of the Soviet Union and the
accompanying centrifugal forces spinning nations apart in that section of the world.
However, as I argued earlier in this paper, current contract law applied to international
law would appear to handle these current secessionary cases with ease. Again, the concept
of a legally justified non-performance of a duty would apply to the seceding former Soviet
states. In fact, secession is not the correct term to apply, for as former sovereign
nations this coerced joining should be nullified. Again, the argument would go that there
were never binding social contracts between these former states and the USSR. Given that
to be true, would Buchanan feel comfortable giving up this argument for rectifying past
wrongs?
I think the answer would be no. Primarily because these
cases are not the cases that this area of liberal political philosophy is really concerned
with. The cases that Buchanan and other liberal writers are really seeking to address are
those of distinctive cultural groups that have been placed together within a nation with
other distinctive cultures with which there is no commonality other than location.
Typically these nations are by-products of Western colonialism. Generally, their examples
are found within a time frame beginning with Columbus and ending shortly after World War
II.
Buchanan, and others, wish to set right that which they
believe to be colonialism's great wrong. They would like to see minority groups, within
these seeming artificial groupings, able to peaceably form their own political entities.
For example they would carve out a Kurdish homeland for Iraq's and Turkey's Kurdish
minorities. This action rectificatory justice requires. Additionally, if secession is a
moral right based on the argument from rectificatory justice, it is a very broad right.
According to Buchanan's reasoning the right to secede based on rectificatory justice goes
beyond territorial claims, "there are cases in which secession is justified even if
there has been no violation of a pre-existing right to territory on the part of the
secessionists."20
This latter argument from rectificatory justice seems to
seriously overreach in seeking cases for legitimate candidates to secede. The most serious
overreach is in ignoring the sovereignty question. Whether with a territorial claim or
not, has the subject group had any history of government outside of the larger group to
which it now belongs? In fact this leads to a second question. How long has the seceding
group been in its current nation structure? These questions bear again upon my contention
that secession is best understood as a legal right rather than a moral one.
Before allowing an extra-territorial claim to succeed it
seems that a minimal requirement is a demonstrated sovereignty for the minority group. If
nothing else this determination would give a clearer understanding of how the subject
group had viewed it's original situation. For example, if the highest form of governance
had been a loose tribal organization, then it would be doubtful that secession would serve
anything other than a return to that dangerous form of rule. If one goal of liberal
political thought is to promote the democratic experience, then extra-territorial
secession will not produce the desired result. An overview of world history shows in more
cases than not that democracy melds disparate groups. Until a democratic tradition has
been in place for a significant time, secession movements from rectificatory justice
should be viewed suspiciously. Democracy tends to diminish the case for rectificatory
justice.
As a secondary question I had posed that the length of time
for the seceding groups union with the larger group was important for their right to
secede. Essentially that argument rests on a legal contention that reliance on a
particular set of circumstance across a significant span of time makes it difficult not to
grant the object of that reliance. If all citizens of the nation had relied upon this
minority, it would be detrimental if that group were to secede. But more than that, there
is an individual moral component to this reliance, which is opposed to the group moral
right concept at the core of Buchanan's rectificatory justice.
The ultimate problem with Buchanan's argument is its basis
in group moral rights. If each individual in a nation, minority or not, is relying on this
as a functioning nation, to now repudiate that expectation of reliance is arguably
duplicitous and immoral. And the affect of that immoral act is again individual in scope.
To argue that a group can speak effectively as to an injustice of these proportions such
that secession is it's only rectifying solution brings us back to the arguments made
earlier on accountability. Without individual involvement in the claiming/exercising of a
moral right there is no clear accountability for immoral actions, and no clear check on
the leadership of a group. In a situation of reliance of such a magnitude, to leave the
decisions for secession up to a nebulous group right is itself immoral.
Individual Rights and the Role of
Revolution
As I have been arguing, group moral rights lack any means to
ensure a clear moral accountability. The interest in group moral rights, I believe, can be
traced to an unnecessary overreaching of the liberal political philosophy's reliance on
equality. Not only is equality being argued as an individual right, but it is also argued
as a group right. Whether the equality being sought is between groups or between
individuals and groups, it has assumed a dominant role in liberal writings. This has lead
writers like Buchanan into advocating principles which only increase the likelihood of
peoples being used in ways that are themselves immoral. As I have already discussed, once
you stray from individual rights and individual accountability immoral choices can be
hidden by a collective rights smoke screen.
Liberal political writers would serve better to strengthen
peoples understanding of their individual rights and responsibilities. The proliferation
of rights in liberal thinking adds far too much complexity to the discussion. More could
be gained from an exposition on individual liberty, then from writing on yet another group
moral right. Especially in this day when so many of the world's people are seeking to live
free for the first time. It would be a valuable effort to help people to understand that
only through the assertion of informed decisions and actions by each individual can
freedom, without which equality is a meaningless right, be secured.
What should such an effort actually say? It should present
an argument from individual enlightened self-interest. By enlightened self interest I mean
as I discussed earlier, individuals joining with others in the social contract by means of
their intuitively known understanding of their own individual moral rights. I argued that
each individual covenants with themselves to be bound by this intuitive
understanding of moral rights in their relations with others. The Golden Rule, do unto
others as you would have them do unto you, being a close approximation of such a
covenant.
This is not to argue that these covenants can be kept in any
consistent or perfect way. Only that because of the individual's enlightened
self-interest, each individual will diligently seek after their interest in a manner that
will minimize their interference with their neighbor's sovereignty. This they can see as
an individual good because of the reciprocal good they hope to receive from minimal
outside interference. What this says is in this covenant relationship each individual
values their own need for individual liberty to such a high degree that they will
respect their neighbor's liberty in order to ensure their own.
Only through such enlightened self-interest can groups form
at all. The one consistent character trait of all people across time has been their
selfish interest. This has been primarily what it meant to be an individual, taking care
of the individual self. However, enlightened self interest recognizes that taking
care of the individual self, requires interaction with other individuals. And these others
have the potential to disrupt individual sovereignty. A direct act of covenanting with
other individuals seems out of question because of the complexity of the action. Besides
the obvious difficulty in making a contract with all individuals, there is also the lack
of a common reference point, a common meeting ground. Some group rights advocates might
argue that common culture is a meeting point, but again I argue an individual
self-interest is antecedent to culture. The only true point of reference for how to deal
effectively with other individuals is the self. Hence the covenant to apply to others that
which you wish for yourself in a collective setting.
Where this understanding of enlightened self-interest can go
wrong is in assuming that the intuitively known moral rights are of a relative nature.
Relative in the sense that each individual believes their moral rights have authority over
any other moral rights. A belief in relative individual moral rights is in every way as
bad as group moral rights, and has many of the same results. Including individuals
assuming leadership roles and leading others in immoral actions that violate the social
contract.
What is needed, therefore, is an absolute moral system that
can be intuitively comprehended by the individual. Does such an absolute system of morals
exist? Well, such a comprehensive topic is beyond this paper, but one example of an
absolute moral system offered for a brief discussion is the Christian moral system. In
particular I will discuss the great commandment as presented by Jesus in the book of
Matthew to his disciples. In the great commandment Jesus stated that the individual was to
"love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul and with all thy mind;
and to love thy neighbor as thyself."
The great commandment is really a summation of the Ten
Commandments. The first four commandments addressed an individual's relation with God, and
the last six addressed
relations with each other. In essence the great commandment
is telling the individual to seek and hold to God as an absolute moral lawgiver, whose
system is revealed through personal experience and through the Bible. The latter part of
the commandment is relevant to the discussion of covenant as I defined it earlier, as a
promise with the self, i.e. the self as subject of the covenant.
How does all of this relate to the particular question of
secession as a group moral right? It relates in two ways. The first is the connection to
the group versus individual rights arguments I have advanced in this paper. I believe
these arguments have cast doubts on the credibility of group moral rights. Primary among
these arguments is the one springing from the need for individuals to exercise a group
right. It is overly complex and hard to demonstrate how individuals can act both on
individual and group moral rights. A more likely portrayal is for the individual, acting
through enlightened self interest, to act for a collective out of their own intuitive
understanding of the individual moral needs of the group.
The second relationship to the question is the essential
group nature of secession itself. Secession is by nature group oriented. There is no
individual nature to secession whatsoever. To secede from a group, nation, or state
implies a taking of territory, wealth, or resource. These are meaningless acts as
performed by an individual, especially within a system that recognizes individual
ownership rights. Buchanan, and others, have made this group connection even stronger by
associating secession with minority rights.21 Given this essential group nature, and the
ill advisability of group moral rights, is there a need or role for secession?
Let me reaffirm that secession is a group activity, but it
is void of moral content. Only in individuals do we have a moral component. In the realm
of national sovereignty when individuals exert their moral right to change their
government outside of normal channels it is called revolution. It is this changing of the
political system that is an essential part of the definition of revolution. Secession is
the group equivalent of revolution without the moral component. Secession is supposedly
void of this political change component, i.e. no one is seeking to overthrow the
government, they are only seeking to leave. However, I argue that this is an
impossibility. There is no logical expectation, outside of a legally defined right to
secede, that a group can break covenant, take land, wealth or other resource without
impacting dramatically the political order.
In other words, secession has a moral impact without having
a moral component. This flies in the face of my earlier arguments that you can not have
moral consequences without individual accountability. We can realize the needed
accountability if we will recognize secession as the variant of revolution that it really
is. Individuals start revolutions, but the number of individuals needed is irrelevant.
Revolutions can start with one individual, or with one million individuals acting
together. But regardless of the number there is the essential individual commitment and
the individual accountability. This same accountability is brought to secession as a
variant of revolution.
Only individuals can begin a process - revolution - to
change the political order. Secession is a variant of this process. While the American
South made it's stated intention to secede from the union it can be argued that this was
really a revolution. One argument to support this can be made according to the reactions
of the North and in particular Lincoln. President Lincoln argued forcibly that the union
must be preserved, even though there was no explicit reason to do so. The South was not a
wealthy region22 and did not take land in states that did not vote to join the
Confederacy. Yet the Union went to war to preserve the nation's integrity. Even the
slavery issue was not cited until after the war began as an issue in why the war was being
fought. The argument can be made that this secession by the South was perceived as a
threat to the political order, i.e. as revolution.
Secession is not of it's own nature a moral right. This is
true, as I have argued, to it's nature as a group moral right, because group moral rights
are problematic and an unnecessary extension of the right's discussion. And this is true
as to its individual rights nature as well. Secession is not an individual moral right
because it by definition includes separation of territory, wealth or resource, done of
which can be done morally by an individual. It does, however, fall under the heading of
revolution as a variant of that individual moral right, including as it does, by its
effect, an unavoidable change to the political order. And gaining in this variant role by
the individual moral accountability that revolution entails.
Conclusion
I have in this paper made an argument for the problematic
nature of group moral rights. I have argued that group rights are derived from the
historic patterns of individual moral rights, and that legal rights are more likely the
nature of group claims. I have argued against secession as a moral right and have
presented the case for it as a variant of revolution. All of these arguments maintain the
key element of individual moral accountability.
Buchanan, and other liberal writers, are undoubtedly, with their theories on
secession, trying to explain a growing movement in the latter part of this century.
However, a majority of the cases can be explained using contract law concepts, without the
need to generate a questionable series of rights based on collectives. This is true
especially for cases like the former Soviet Union which were coerced unions in their
inception. Those cases that do not easily fit the contract law criteria can be explained
under the rubric of revolution. While secessionary movements will obviously continue, it
is unnecessary to refer to group moral rights for their explanation. Revolution continues
to convey the correct mix of rights and accountability.
Footnotes
1Allen E. Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right
to Secede"(1992) Journal of International Affairs 347-365
2Allen E. Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political
Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991)
3J. Angelo Corlett,"The Problem of Collective Moral
Rights"(1994) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 237-259
4Ibid. at 243
5Ibid. at 245
6Buchanan, Secession, 74 (italics are mine)
7Buchanan, Secession, 75
8Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts (St. Paul:
West Publishing Co.,1952) 3-4.
9W.E.Vine, Vine's Expository Dictionary of New Testament
Words, (Nashville, TN: Royal Publishers, Inc.) 1939
10Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, 923
11Ibid. at 924
12Ibid. at 924
13Buchanan, Secession, 27
14Buchanan, Secession, 29-74
15Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to
Secede", 353-358
16Buchanan, Secession, 74
17"Self-Determination and the Right to Secede",
Buchanan, 354
18 Buchanan, Secession, 41
19Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to
Secede", 353
20 Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to
Secede", 353
21Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to
Secede", 349
22Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to
Secede", 357
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