Quinian Sensation and Empathy,

and a Different Perceptual Model

by Glenn R. Jackson

Copyright 1998 Glenn R. Jackson

This far along in the philosophic conversation about perception it seems safe to say that science is leading the discussion. Is stimulation of sensory receptors the gateway to perception? Specifically how is the gap between sensation and perception bridged? Quine presents a theory which urges us to conclude that stimulation of sensory receptors is the beginning of perception, that observation sentences are our linguistic bridge from stimulation to perception, and that science is the theory behind our perceiving and thus knowing the world. However, I believe that Quine, and others who are advocating a scientific epistemology, are limiting epistemology to the overall detriment of the discussion. Science, while offering a good method for explaining the mechanism of physically induced perceptions, discounts the possibility of perceptions through other than physical means.

That leads me to ask, is there an evidential case to be made for perception beyond sensory stimulation, given our current understanding of sensory stimulation? The importance of such a case being made is not to limit the use of science as an explainer of the world, but to enlarge the discussion of what and how we know. Given the current infatuation with scientific epistemology, perception has become a very mechanistic and uninteresting activity. There is more to being human than being an organic machine. In particular there is the unrelenting human belief in something beyond sense, yet effective of who and what we are. Such longevity of belief deserves to be argued thoroughly by any epistemologic theory. While it is not my intent to argue that science will not lead to an understanding of such human beliefs. I am urging that science not be used as a limit to attaining that human understanding. I offer a paraphrased quote from Dr. Robert Jastrow of the Mount Wilson Institute as an argument to remember for those who are participating in the epistemologic discussion. Jastrow said that when Physicist (or scientist in general) finally scale to the top of the mountain of knowledge, he would not be surprised if the Theologians were not already there waiting for them.

Given that general understanding of this paper's aims, are there cases of perceptions that circumvent the physical sensory net and still retain a claim to externality? I believe that there are such cases. I will discuss one such case in the light of Quine's scientific or behavioristic epistemology. I will begin by presenting what I consider to be Quine's theory of perception. Offering a brief discussion of his views of sensation, and the concepts of observation sentences and intersubjectivity. Or, in short, what Quine considers to be the evidential support for a scientific theory of epistemology. I will end the first section with a discussion of Quine's use of "empathy" as a curious tool for validating perception. And I will then make the argument that Quine's use of empathy leaves the door open for recognizing perceptions that can circumvent our typical sensory gateways.

Quine's theory begins with a world of external objects. Through various physical means, such as reflected light and air vibrations, external objects stimulate or trigger various sensory receptors. Now on an individual level, i.e. the level of an independent perceiver, the stimulation or the feel of falling water droplets elicits a learned behavioral response verbalized by an observation that "it is raining". What occurs for Quine on a theoretical level with such a perception like "it is raining"?

At the theoretical level we have science functioning as a "field of force" absorbing experiences (through sensory stimulations) and processing them either for their predictive confirmations or for their internal adjustments to the total scientific theory. "It is raining" is an observation sentence directly linked to the sensory stimulation. Observation sentences provide what can be considered as evidential support for the underlying scientific theory. "The observation sentence is the means of verbalizing the prediction that checks a theory." Prediction, as used by Quine, means that the observation sentence provides a "test" for the theory. The direct and firm link with stimulation is what makes the observation sentence a good predictive measure for Quine . Such a linkage requires immediate assent - "it is raining", or dissent - "it is not raining", without a need for further investigation. This direct link between observation sentence and stimulation also points to a second requirement, that of intersubjectivity. The observation sentence must elicit the "same verdict from all linguistically competent witnesses of the occasion."

Given the fulfillment of these two requirements of an observation sentence, an independent observer would state that "x" perceives that "p" where "p" is an observation sentence such as "it is raining." Perception follows the order of sensory stimulation then observation sentence, thus communicating the perception to other "linguistically competent witnesses." The observation sentence is the linguistic foundation for Quine's science based epistemology. Science requires verifiability across a community, and this is the very definition of an observation sentence; "...observation sentences are the sentences on which all members of the community will agree under uniform stimulation." The larger the community considered the more absolute the measure of knowledge. Clearly this aspect of Quine's epistemology seems to have a close relationship to the scientific method: "observation sentences are the repository of evidence for scientific hypotheses." . Observation sentences are tied to measurable physical stimulations. Observation sentences are verifiable or provable experimentally. Hence observation sentences can be seen as conveying a level of knowledge.

However, at this point we find Quine introducing a curious concept within a scientific theory. Quine explains that each perception of rain, while a sensory event, will differ somewhat even for the same observer because of individualized differences in neurology, timing, and stimulation across occurrences. These differences are compounded across a group of observers. Yet, Quine maintains that for a group "it is raining" is a valid observation sentence, satisfying the requirement of intersubjectivity and immediate assent from the group. How then does Quine, given his acknowledgment of varied neurology, timing, etc. for the same stimulation event across a group of many observers, facilitate the communication across the group of the perception that "p" - "it is raining?" He handles group instances by introducing the concept of empathy. A concept that entails on the same occasion of "raining" "x" will perceive that "y" also perceives that "it is raining" by empathizing "y's" perception that "it is raining." Presumably, even though neurological interpretations may vary between individuals, there remains enough similarities to ensure the intersubjectivity requirement of this observation sentence is met. Of course such a presumption is easy to make with the example of "raining" being used here, but what about "redness"? Better yet what about seeing "blue" and "green"? In a blue/green example, besides the individual neurological differences, there is also the matter of color blindness to contend with. Empathy for a color blind individual would seem to offer a problem for the intersubjectivity of an observation sentences. Can "This is blue" be empathized from others without the concept of "blue" even being understood? And if so, what kind of agreement do we have between a community of "linguistically competent witnesses"?

Quine's use of empathy runs even to perceptions that have no observational content for person "x" other than observing person "y". As an example he offers that "x", without prior sensory stimulation, perceives that "the train is late" by empathizing that "y" perceives "the train is late". This view would also seem to imply that "x" can perceive that "the train is late" without any direct and personal sensory stimulation simply from empathizing with "y"'s perception that "the train is late". Empathy is a curious concept to interject in a consistent science based theory of perception. As I have already alluded the individual differences surrounding sensory reception is problematic for Quine's observation sentence and intersubjectivity in particular. Here it seems that the direct link between sensory reception and observation sentence is being severed by relying on what could be viewed as no more than a "feeling" that person "y" believes the train to be late. Granted, Quine's use of empathy can rely on the components of learned behavior and internalized observations. In other words, certain observable behaviors, pacing, clock checking, and impatient glances, can be linked in a train station situation to "the train is late." However, with the concerns mentioned above regarding the individual differences of sensory reception, whether learned over time or internalized, it seems intersubjectivity suffers with a much weaker linkage. Couple that with the loss of a direct sensory stimulation (remember, with the use of empathy it seems you can perceive that the train is late before you see, hear, touch, taste, or smell that the train is late) and it appears that "empathy" has become a bridge for intersubjectivity in situations where knowledge is needed, but direct verifiable sensation is lacking.

In handling perceptions of things that are beyond direct sensory stimulation with this concept of empathy, Quine has done two things. First, empathy weakens Quine's sense of the observation sentence's "predictive", or purposeful "testing" of theory. Empathizing with the perception of others increases the likelihood of mistake, while lessening the overall predictive value. By repeated observation and the passage of time the probability of mistake can be lessened, but never eliminated when you are empathizing your perceptions from other's perceptions. By adopting empathy as a way to extend perception across groups, the predictiveness of an observation sentence as a "test" of theory weakens to become consistency over time as a "test" of theory.

Second, empathy leaves open the possibility of perception absent any sensory stimulation. You can perceive that "the train is late" by direct sensory stimulation, by the observation sentences of another, and now it seems that you can perceive "the train is late" by reading the explicit and implicit body language of another. Empathy leaves a lot of interpretive function to the perceiver. In fact empathy seems to handle cases built upon "feeling" as well as sensory stimulation. "Y" feels that "the train is late", "x" empathizes that "y" feels "the train is late" and thereby "x" perceives that "the train is late."

Given these two questionable areas for Quine's epistemology, introduced by his use of empathy as a perceptual tool, I will make a case for direct perception, i.e. a case for a perceptive event originating externally, but being perceived without the aid of our physical sensory receptors. The point of presenting a case for direct perception is simply, within this papers scope, to raise the possibility of an external existence apprehendable, but not through our normal sensory receptors. I see the good of this as slowing the rush to embrace a limited scientific or behavioristic epistemology, and thereby missing the opportunity for a fuller and richer epistemology. I will build this case from an example of a perception, which in religious circles is generally labeled a "conversion experience."

A conversion experience could be described by the example of Saul, later Paul the Apostle, or Augustine. The defining point of a conversion experience is a moment of life changing perception, with an absence of sensory input such that the moment is considered "revelational" in origin. I will use as my particular discussion case the Aldersgate experience of John Wesley, the founder of Methodism.

As way of background, which will be important for the following discussion, I will present a quick overview of Wesley's life. He was the son of an Anglican minister and was raised religiously, as you would expect. He attended Oxford where he was a founder of the Holy Club, a group that included his brother Charles Wesley and friend George Whitefield, both later to become influential Christian ministers. John Wesley, unsurprisingly, chose as a profession to also be a minister. He was, however, by self admission and the observations of others something of a failure in his chosen profession. He left England to try his hand as a missionary in Georgia, but was soon to return to England in disgrace. Wesley spent a great deal of time during this period seeking after what he characterized as the "assurance of God", translated for the purposes of this paper as seeking a direct perception of God. On May 24, 1738, while listening to a reading of the Preface to Luther's Commentary on Romans at a meeting in Aldersgate house, John Wesley records in his Journal "I felt my heart strangely warmed." This event was interpreted by Wesley and others as a direct awareness or perception of God. Without going into more detail, it is only important to make three comments. The Aldersgate experience was a self-declared turning point for John Wesley. Further, it was a historically verifiable turning point in his life. And lastly, there was such a powerful change in the life and work of John Wesley that some historians have credited Wesley's work and ministry with reversing what was an almost assured slide toward revolution in England.

"Uniting their influence with that of industrialism, they fashioned the character of the English middle class, dogmatic in morals, proud of its practical outlook, and sufficiently powerful to obtain respect for its views....The ruling classes watched the growth of this new power, whose nature they could not comprehend. They knew that the British Constitution did not give them sufficient strength to repress a general rebellion. And they perceived that the development of industrialism was rendering the social order more unstable and multiplying industrial and political crises. So they called to mind the French Revolution and the American War of Independence and feared 'Methodism' almost equally with Jacobinism. Had they understood the situation better, they would have realized that Methodism was the antidote to Jacobinism, and that the free organization of the sects was the foundation of social order..."

In returning to the point of this section, can Wesley's report that his "heart was strangely warmed" be taken as a Quinian observation sentence? Well obviously this is an event not on the order of "it is raining". Every normal sensory event that Wesley experienced that evening he had experienced before. It is hardly likely that Wesley mistook one sensation for another that evening. Yet, only on this evening did he report a "heart strangely warmed." And only on this evening did his lifelong doubts about his own salvation turn to belief in "the full assurance of God" that he (Wesley) was "saved". Theological discussions aside, does this transition from doubt to belief provide some evidential support to there being a perceptual occurrence outside of normal sense reception?

Earlier I had asked if "a heart strangely warmed" could be taken as an observation sentence. Given the argument I am trying to advance, that direct sensory stimulation is not part of this perceptual example, it would seem that right away there is a problem with this example as an observation sentence. Without question Quine's direct sensory reception and my direct perceptual event, in appearance, are poles apart. After all, that is the point of the contention. However, if we simplify what Quine's definition really entails it can be seen as encompassing externality and sensation. It is only Quine's presuppositions about science that necessitates his inclusion of the five sensory receptors as critical to perception.

Let me say that again. Quine presupposes science. Science is a method for verification by observable experimental means. Experimental means repeatable, and observable means, by definition, one of the five physical senses. This reliance on the scientific method dictates Quines linkage to the physical sense receptors. In reality what Quine really requires is an event of external origin and a sensation impinging on the individual. External origin meaning not starting as an internal mental event, and sensation meaning individually recognizable. As I said at the beginning of this paper, with science as a presupposition, epistemology is being limited to what science alone can explain.

However, if we begin by presupposing an external world and individual sensation, and always return to these presuppositions as a base, then epistemology has a fuller explanatory reach. Such a base can make use of science to explain what science explains best, without closing discussion to those more interesting areas that science can not explain.

Again to the example of John Wesley, I earlier purposefully noted the personal history of mediocrity in Wesley's life. Wesley himself noted countless times in his journals his misery and doubt about "the full assurance of God;" "By the most infallible of proofs, inward feeling, I am convinced: I. Of unbelief - having no such faith in Christ as will prevent my heart from being troubled." Doubt hung very heavily about Wesley. And this not doubt in the Cartesian sense, where logic alone was behind the feeling of doubt. This was a deep and personally felt doubt that could not be banished by any internal means.

The essence of the conversion experience is the absence of any internal individually identifiable means to affect the later observable change. This leaves an external cause as the only possible explanation. John Wesley's early life could be characterized as one of growing doubt. After Aldersgate his life became one of belief and growing belief. All evidence and testimony point to the Aldersgate experience as the changing event in Wesley's life. The salient point here is the transition from doubt to belief. Such a transition can not be said to occur in a vacuum. There was nothing to indicate in Wesley's mind or in the observation of others that Wesley would change his pattern to that date. Nevertheless a change of great proportions occurred. I contend that Wesley's Aldersgate experience passes the first Quinian hurdle of originating as an external sensation, and it meets my requirement as being directly perceived without normal sensory content.

The other area to contend with is the intersubjectivity of the experience. Does the Wesleyan experience elicit the "same verdict from all linguistically competent witnesses?" In answering this question Wesley's transition from doubt to belief, again plays an important explanatory role.

Quine obviously understands intersubjectivity to mean that each witness to an event like "raining" will come to the same verdict. However, this again brings out the presuppositional bias that science has brought to Quine's epistemology by limiting perception to sensory events in a common time and space for all witnesses. This is such a tight constraint on perception, only encompassing a small percentage of overall human experience, that it is arguably the reason Quine found the need to bring empathy into the discussion.

Already noted early in this paper is the curious nature of such a concept for a scientific epistemology. Empathy seems to be a Quinian bridge for finding intersubjectivity while direct sensation is absent.

Within the Christian community the doubt/belief transition that was characterized by Wesley's Aldersgate experience, i.e. the conversion experience, is the essence of the Christian faith. Each member of the community, necessarily to being a member of the community, understands readily what this conversion entails. While not jointly experienced as an event like "raining", it nevertheless is as common an experience within the Christian community as is "the train is late" among commuters. That said, what verdict would be rendered to Wesley's "heart strangely warmed" by all "linguistically competent witnesses?" The verdict of history is that Wesley experienced a direct, non-sensory perception.

I had argued earlier that by introducing this curious concept of empathy Quine had weakened his idea of an observation sentence "testing" a theory, from "predictive" to consistency. Only with consistency over time for a group of individually different observers could he hope to achieve a true "test" of theory.

Applying this to Wesley's Aldersgate experience, consistency of history was not predictive of the Wesleyan influence after Aldersgate. In addition, the consistency of success after Aldersgate argued for something new in Wesley's experiences. Based on this factor of consistency of success, the consistency of the conversion experience within the Christian community, and the testimony to the individual sensation of a "heart strangely warmed", I contend that Wesley's conversion experience was as perceptual an event as "the train is late".

Having argued that Quine's definition of an observation sentence is not the scientifically precise definition that he intended. I summit John Wesley's "strangely warmed heart" as a valid observation sentence. As an observation sentence Wesley's statement conveys not the sensory stimulation Quine envisioned, but the empathically confirmable occurrence of an external and direct perceptual event. Such a conclusion lessens the strict requirements of a Quine-like scientific epistemology. Thus adding impetus to an investigative epistemology that admits into the evidential process a broader and fuller representation of what and how we know.

Bibliography

Halevy, Elie, England in 1815, (New York: Peter Smith, 1949)

Outler, Albert ed., John Wesley, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964)

Quine, W.V., J.S. Ullian, The Web of Belief, (New York: Random House, 1978)

Quine, Willard Van Orman, From a Logical Point of View,"Two Dogmas of Empiricism", (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980)

Quine, Willard Van Orman, Pursuit of Truth, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992)

Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays,"Epistemology Naturalized",(New York: Columbia University Press, 1969)

Tuttle, Robert G., John Wesley: His Life and Theology,(Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1978)