

# Secession, Moral Accountability, and Revolution

By Glenn R. Jackson

Liberal political philosophy has showcased an increasing proliferation of rights and entitlements as the centerpiece of its explanation of how and why people interact with governments. This is surely a natural outgrowth of the liberal struggle to make equality the primary moral standard. It is arguable that equality, as framed by liberal writers, is only supportable by creating just such a broad range of moral rights. The subject of this paper deals generally with a category of moral rights that has appeared on the liberal horizon - group moral rights. In particular this paper will address the group moral right of secession, especially as secession is presented and argued by Allen Buchanan in *Self-determination and the Right to Secede*<sup>1</sup> and *Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec*.<sup>2</sup>

In this paper it will be argued that group moral rights are an unnecessary extension of the moral rights discussion and in particular that secession as a group moral right is too problematic in its supposed nature to be supported. Also, it will be argued that secession is not of the moral nature presented by Buchanan, i.e. secession should not be recognized as a moral right.

## The Question of Collective Moral Rights

There are those in liberal circles that argue for secession as the one sure irreducible collective moral right.<sup>3</sup> Angelo Corlett in *The Problem of Collective Moral Rights* says, "it is difficult to make sense of the right to secede on distributivist grounds."<sup>4</sup> But there appear to be two objections that cast doubts on the plausibility of this claim for secession and, by extension, for the whole notion of group moral rights.

The first objection deals with how groups exercise their moral rights, i.e. make moral choices, such as the decision on whether or not to secede. Inevitably in such cases it is up to individuals to make those choices. It has been argued that individuals in these cases are acting in the interest of the group - "one difference between a right the subject of which is an individual and one the subject of which is a collective is that a collective moral right, unlike an individual one, gives some member of the collective the power to claim that right for the collective..."<sup>5</sup> Buchanan states that "group rights are ascribed to collections of individuals and can only be exercised collectively or at *least on behalf* of the collective..."<sup>6</sup> These statements imply that individuals must take a leadership role in exercising collective moral rights.

Now this is a curious thing. Why would a collective moral right require an individual to claim that right for the collective? Claiming a right inevitably leads to exercising the right and thereby making a choice that will have moral consequences. That individuals can commit a collective to a moral choice is problematic. It is founded on the troubling idea, advanced by Buchanan for one, that the interests

being served by an individual exercising a collective moral right are each individual's interests as members of that group.<sup>7</sup> This implies that an individual or subset of individuals can commit the group to a course of action to which each member of the group has a moral interest and is in moral agreement.

What is to ensure that the few might not be committing the group to a path which itself may be immoral and deny rights to others? Through what mechanism do the claiming individuals determine that they are acting on a group right and in the group interest? It seems just as likely that the few acting for the many could be seeking their own self interest. As was mentioned above, the individuals claiming the right for the group are, almost by definition, in leadership roles. That is to say that there is some individual characteristic about them personally that places them in a position to be claimors for the group. Historically this can be seen as true. There are those individuals who are marked by some characteristic of confidence or self-interest that places them to the forefront of their representative group. This is not to say that these individuals will not represent their groups well. It is to say that with this obviously strong *individualistic* influence it is impossible to say with any certitude that it is a group moral right being acted upon. An obvious example to structure this discussion would be Hitler's Germany.

In the lead up to World War II, Hitler used the ethnic German minorities in many neighboring nations to build secession movements as a pretense to invasion. Leaders of these movements, whether as willing dupes or puppets, argued for the moral rights of their respective groups. In each instance there was a ready following among the minority population. Many participated in activities that furthered a perceived common interest, but only truly benefited the plans of one man and his closest aides. Clearly these activities in the end had immoral results, but who acted immorally? Intuitively it is the leaders that are held accountable for these actions and their consequences. It would be hard to hold the minority German populations accountable in a collective moral way for the actions of the few. Condemnation of each member of the group for the immoral actions of their leaders ignores the distinct possibility of individual dissent with those actions. The notion of group moral rights ignores the assignment of accountability to those acting on these supposed group rights. Without individual involvement in the claiming/exercising of a moral right there is no clear accountability for immoral actions, and no clear check on the leadership of a group.

The second objection to this view of secession as an irreducible collective moral right relates to Buchanan's suggestion of a constitutional right to secede. Secession is claimed as a group moral right, yet it seems to gain the most strength from an explicit statement of its conditions in a legal document. My contention is that those who have argued for group moral rights have all along been substituting legal rights for collective moral rights without recognizing that they - the legal rights - are distributive to underlying individual moral rights. Individuals have moral rights. Groups have legal rights established by application of those same individual moral rights over time.

**"Legal relations are merely existing facts of life viewed in the light of a past uniformity of societal action, that enable us to predict similar action in the future with respect to two or more persons."8**

**Legal relations take individual moral rights and codify them for application to individuals or groups. I would argue that this idea that group rights are legal conventions only, gives us a better understanding as to the true nature of these rights.**

**As conceded by most advocates of group rights, it takes an individual to exercise rights for the group. And, as I have already argued, it is doubtful that these individuals are really acting on a group right, but are more likely acting from an antecedent individual moral right. Based on that, I would argue that groups are acting from either an implicit or explicit covenant to be bound by their own intuitively recognizable individual moral rights. Further I would state that the more formal the group arrangement the more explicit the covenant.**

**My understanding of covenant is not, however, the traditional English use of the word, but is the use as understood in the Greek word *Diatheke*. The distinction is between the English binding obligation between two or more individuals, and the Greek obligation undertaken by a single individual.9 So if I were to enter the social contract discussion I would not advocate that individuals in a state of nature, through some figurative handshake, would covenant with each other to form a rudimentary governing group. Instead, I would argue that each individual covenants with *themselves* to be bound by their intuitively known understanding of moral rights in their relations with others. This is best expounded by the Golden Rule, *do unto others as you would have them do unto you*. This eliminates, by necessity, any need to create or argue for group moral rights.**

**As groups mature these intuitively understood and individually held moral rights become less implicit and are developed explicitly in the rules or laws of the group. Once the explicit social contract reaches a certain stage then violations of the contract which occur become obvious. There is a clearer understanding of the violation by each member of the group and concerted action can be taken by the group. Secession could be viewed as the repudiation of the social contract whereby one sub-group has reason to assert a claim against the majority group. This puts secession in a position very much akin to an area of contract law concerned with repudiation, i.e. breach of contract.**

**If we take a social contract view of governance or group/collective involvement, then we can talk of duties. In particular we can talk about duties that accrue to governments to protect and serve the individual moral and legal rights of their citizens. Once we talk of rights and duties then we can address those instances where we witness a non-performance of duty - "a breach of contract is always a non-performance of duty; but it is not every non-performance of duty that is a breach of contract."10**

Under the American system of contract law it is generally held that "whenever there is a *legal justification* for the non-performance of a promise (duty) there is no breach of contractual duty."<sup>11</sup> An example of a legally justified non-performance of a duty in a national sphere would be any of the *seceding* former Soviet states. It is a clearly recognized legal principle that contracts are not binding when they are coerced. For example, a union forged at the point of a gun would clearly be coerced. So the argument would go that there were never binding social contracts between these former states and the USSR. These once sovereign nations had been forced by a stronger neighbor into an illegal union. The states have no need to secede, but can simply walk away from this non-binding union.

It is further held under contract law that "a breach of contract may be committed by prevention, hindrance or repudiation."<sup>12</sup> An example for this case of breach of contract would be the American colonies fighting for independence from Britain. The colonist stated in their Declaration of Independence that they were *prevented* from attaining their individual moral rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The social contract had been breached by the British Crown and the colonist felt justified in seeking separation. While this example is arguably not a case of secession, it nevertheless supports the argument that secession can be addressed as a legal principle.

I have made a case for the problematic nature of the argument to support group moral rights. I have argued that legal rights, derived from the historic patterns of individual moral rights, are a better way to view group moral rights. And I have given an argument for viewing secession as at most a legal right derived from antecedent individual moral rights. I will use the remainder of this paper to apply this understanding to a critical view of Buchanan's arguments about the moral nature of secession as he has presented them in *Secession* and *Self Determination and the Right to Secede*.

### Buchanan and Secession as a Moral Right

Buchanan believes two things about secession: "1)that it is *morally permissible* for those who have this right *to secede*, and 2)that others are *morally obligated not to interfere* with their seceding."<sup>13</sup> It is the permissibility and non-interference that gives secession its moral authority and its status as a moral right. Buchanan develops twelve distinct pro-secession arguments in *Secession*<sup>14</sup>, but only addresses four of those in his following work.<sup>15</sup> This I believe is a concession to the relative strength of the arguments, or as Buchanan himself admits "among the strongest arguments and most widely applicable arguments for a right to secede are the argument from rectificatory justice and the argument from discriminatory redistribution."<sup>16</sup> I agree with this assessment and will restrict my discussion to these two arguments.

### Discriminatory Redistribution

**"A state engages in discriminatory redistribution whenever it implements taxation schemes, regulatory policies or economic programs that systematically work to the disadvantage of some groups while benefiting others, in morally arbitrary ways."<sup>17</sup>**

**In a general way this argument presents the liberal political position with something of a problem from a consistency point of view. The liberal welfare state is about redistribution of individual wealth through tax, regulation, or economic programs. The distinction made by Buchanan between redistribution which he supports as rightful and redistribution which he supports as grounds for secession is the moral reasoning consequent to the process of redistribution. For example, if we review recent changes to the U.S. tax policy and the attending arguments, tax rates were increased on the top two per cent of the income bracket to ensure overall fairness in the income distribution in the U.S. tax system, i.e. there was a discrimination made in the tax policy for a moral reason, to promote fairness.**

**What if the top two per cent saw a tax increase to fund project Headstart? What if the top two per cent saw a tax increase to fund the Star Wars project? Each of these questions addresses something that to some group is morally justified and to another is morally arbitrary. Buchanan is advocating a litmus test for the process of redistribution that is consequential to that process. In other words, Buchanan starts with redistribution as a given good, and only evaluates the consequences for moral arbitrariness to determine the grounds for secession. But I contend that once you grant redistribution of individual wealth as morally just, any consequential justification has itself become morally interchangeable, and arguably arbitrary. Therefore the discriminatory redistribution litmus test can be used by anyone to support his or her position. It does not lead to certitude about the moral rightness of secession.**

**If you have made a moral decision about a process like redistribution any moral qualifier needed is really about directing the process. By that I mean, addressing the questions above, educating disadvantaged children and protecting them from a foreign power can both be argued as a good, but probably not by the same group or with the same priority. The group that controls the process makes the decision as to what is arbitrary or not. So, unless Buchanan is arguing that secession is analogous to children, who finding they are not getting their way in the game take the ball and go home, then these consequential moral qualifiers can not be moral grounds for secession as he intends.**

**The top two percent of Americans receiving the tax increase in our original example arguably felt discriminated against since they were singled out and vilified as greedy. They could also make the argument that the truly moral thing to have done was allow them to invest that money in ways that would benefit the economy to everyone's advantage. A good argument could be crafted from this example to meet Buchanan's discriminatory redistribution threshold. Yet no one would seriously support a two per center's secession. Why? Buchanan would argue that the reason there would be no support was because the redistribution had been morally just and not arbitrary. I would argue that the reason no one expects secession is because the**

redistribution process had been *morally validated subsequent* to the tax increase, and the tax increases themselves are immaterial.

What is material for the two per centers in the example above, and for historic examples to be explored, is the political system. My argument is that the political system generates the redistribution process, which then generates consequences for which Buchanan has provided a litmus test. It is this subsequent political system that is subject to moral justification. If this system is moral then individuals living under its governance can feel sure that the system, while not perfect, is self-correcting. Individual voices and concerns will be heard and actions taken to correct any morally arbitrary process that is created. The two per centers have no grounds to secede because they believe the system to still be morally just, perhaps misguided, but they are accepting of the redistribution process regardless of their opinion as to its arbitrary moral consequences.

If we review a couple of historic examples we can see this argument supported. For example the American South, by my argument, seceded not because of discriminatory redistribution as Buchanan suggests,<sup>18</sup> but because they anticipated that the system was no longer morally just and self-correcting. Whether correct or not, the South judged the system to be failing them and decided their course as a nation was best charted alone.

An even clearer example is the American Revolution. American school children are taught in their history classes the slogan "No taxation without representation." What can speak more clearly than that to the underlying issue of an immoral political system leaving the colonist with no choice save revolution. When a political system ignores the individuals it governs, its moral authority is questionable. If you make a social contract argument as I have, then the individual question of is the

covenant made being fulfilled to the individual's good answers in the negative. If enough individuals have the same negative answer then a political change is imminent.

### **Rectificatory Justice**

"The most compelling justification for secession may be called the argument from rectificatory justice...The argument's power stems from the assumption that secession is simply the reappropriation, by the legitimate owners, of stolen property. The right to secede, under these circumstances, is just the right to reclaim what is one's own."<sup>19</sup>

Rectificatory justification is indeed a compelling argument for secession, especially in the latter part of the Twentieth century. Part of that argument's appeal springs from the spectacular break-up of the Soviet Union and the accompanying centrifugal forces spinning nations apart in that section of the world. However, as I argued earlier in this paper, current contract law applied to international law would appear to handle these current secessionary cases with ease. Again, the concept of a legally justified non-performance of a duty would apply to the seceding former

**Soviet states. In fact, secession is not the correct term to apply, for as former sovereign nations this coerced joining should be nullified. Again, the argument would go that there were never binding social contracts between these former states and the USSR. Given that to be true, would Buchanan feel comfortable giving up this argument for rectifying past wrongs?**

**I think the answer would be no. Primarily because these cases are not the cases that this area of liberal political philosophy is really concerned with. The cases that Buchanan and other liberal writers are really seeking to address are those of distinctive cultural groups that have been placed together within a nation with other distinctive cultures with which there is no commonality other than location. Typically these nations are by-products of Western colonialism. Generally, their examples are found within a time frame beginning with Columbus and ending shortly after World War II.**

**Buchanan, and others, wish to set right that which they believe to be colonialism's great wrong. They would like to see minority groups, within these seeming artificial groupings, able to peaceably form their own political entities. For example they would carve out a Kurdish homeland for Iraq's and Turkey's Kurdish minorities. This action rectificatory justice requires. Additionally, if secession is a moral right based on the argument from rectificatory justice, it is a very broad right. According to Buchanan's reasoning the right to secede based on rectificatory justice goes beyond territorial claims, "there are cases in which secession is justified even if there has been no violation of a pre-existing right to territory on the part of the secessionists."<sup>20</sup>**

**This latter argument from rectificatory justice seems to seriously overreach in seeking cases for legitimate candidates to secede. The most serious overreach is in ignoring the sovereignty question. Whether with a territorial claim or not, has the subject group had any history of government outside of the larger group to which it now belongs? In fact this leads to a second question. How long has the seceding group been in its current nation structure? These questions bear again upon my contention that secession is best understood as a legal right rather than a moral one.**

**Before allowing an extra-territorial claim to succeed it seems that a minimal requirement is a demonstrated sovereignty for the minority group. If nothing else this determination would give a clearer understanding of how the subject group had viewed it's original situation. For example, if the highest form of governance had been a loose tribal organization, then it would be doubtful that secession would serve anything other than a return to that dangerous form of rule. If one goal of liberal political thought is to promote the democratic experience, then extra-territorial secession will not produce the desired result. An overview of world history shows in more cases than not that democracy melds disparate groups. Until a democratic tradition has been in place for a significant time, secession movements from rectificatory justice should be viewed suspiciously. Democracy tends to diminish the case for rectificatory justice.**

As a secondary question I had posed that the length of time for the seceding groups union with the larger group was important for their right to secede. Essentially that argument rests on a legal contention that reliance on a particular set of circumstance across a significant span of time makes it difficult not to grant the object of that reliance. If all citizens of the nation had relied upon this minority, it would be detrimental if that group were to secede. But more than that, there is an individual moral component to this reliance, which is opposed to the group moral right concept at the core of Buchanan's rectificatory justice.

The ultimate problem with Buchanan's argument is its basis in group moral rights. If each individual in a nation, minority or not, is relying on this as a functioning nation, to now repudiate that expectation of reliance is arguably duplicitous and immoral. And the affect of that immoral act is again individual in scope. To argue that a group can speak effectively as to an injustice of these proportions such that secession is it's only rectifying solution brings us back to the arguments made earlier on accountability. Without individual involvement in the claiming/exercising of a moral right there is no clear accountability for immoral actions, and no clear check on the leadership of a group. In a situation of reliance of such a magnitude, to leave the decisions for secession up to a nebulous group right is itself immoral.

### **Individual Rights and the Role of Revolution**

As I have been arguing, group moral rights lack any means to ensure a clear moral accountability. The interest in group moral rights, I believe, can be traced to an unnecessary overreaching of the liberal political philosophy's reliance on equality. Not only is equality being argued as an individual right, but it is also argued as a group right. Whether the equality being sought is between groups or between individuals and groups, it has assumed a dominant role in liberal writings. This has lead writers like Buchanan into advocating principles which only increase the likelihood of peoples being used in ways that are themselves immoral. As I have already discussed, once you stray from individual rights and individual accountability immoral choices can be hidden by a collective rights smoke screen.

Liberal political writers would serve better to strengthen peoples understanding of their individual rights and responsibilities. The proliferation of rights in liberal thinking adds far too much complexity to the discussion. More could be gained from an exposition on individual liberty, then from writing on yet another group moral right. Especially in this day when so many of the world's people are seeking to live free for the first time. It would be a valuable effort to help people to understand that only through the assertion of informed decisions and actions by each individual can freedom, without which equality is a meaningless right, be secured.

What should such an effort actually say? It should present an argument from individual enlightened self-interest. By enlightened self interest I mean as I discussed earlier, individuals joining with others in the social contract by means of their intuitively known understanding of their own individual moral rights. I argued that each individual covenants with *themselves* to be bound by this intuitive understanding of moral rights in their relations with others. The Golden Rule, *do*

*unto others as you would have them do unto you*, being a close approximation of such a covenant.

This is not to argue that these covenants can be kept in any consistent or perfect way. Only that because of the individual's enlightened self-interest, each individual will diligently seek after their interest in a manner that will minimize their interference with their neighbor's sovereignty. This they can see as an individual good because of the reciprocal good they hope to receive from minimal outside interference. What this says is in this covenant relationship each individual values their own need for individual *liberty* to such a high degree that they will respect their neighbor's *liberty* in order to ensure their own.

Only through such enlightened self-interest can groups form at all. The one consistent character trait of all people across time has been their selfish interest. This has been primarily what it meant to be an individual, taking care of the individual self. However, *enlightened* self interest recognizes that taking care of the individual self, requires interaction with other individuals. And these others have the potential to disrupt individual sovereignty. A direct act of covenanting with other individuals seems out of question because of the complexity of the action. Besides the obvious difficulty in making a contract with all individuals, there is also the lack of a common reference point, a common meeting ground. Some group rights advocates might argue that common culture is a meeting point, but again I argue an individual self-interest is antecedent to culture. The only true point of reference for how to deal effectively with other individuals is the self. Hence the covenant to apply to others that which you wish for yourself in a collective setting.

Where this understanding of enlightened self-interest can go wrong is in assuming that the intuitively known moral rights are of a relative nature. Relative in the sense that each individual believes their moral rights have authority over any other moral rights. A belief in relative individual moral rights is in every way as bad as group moral rights, and has many of the same results. Including individuals assuming leadership roles and leading others in immoral actions that violate the social contract.

What is needed, therefore, is an absolute moral system that can be intuitively comprehended by the individual. Does such an absolute system of morals exist? Well, such a comprehensive topic is beyond this paper, but one example of an absolute moral system offered for a brief discussion is the Christian moral system. In particular I will discuss the great commandment as presented by Jesus in the book of Matthew to his disciples. In the great commandment Jesus stated that the individual was to "love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul and with all thy mind; and to love thy neighbor as thyself."

The great commandment is really a summation of the Ten Commandments. The first four commandments addressed an individual's relation with God, and the last six addressed

relations with each other. In essence the great commandment is telling the individual to seek and hold to God as an absolute moral lawgiver, whose system is revealed through personal experience and through the Bible. The latter part of the commandment is relevant to the discussion of covenant as I defined it earlier, as a promise with the self, i.e. the self as subject of the covenant.

How does all of this relate to the particular question of secession as a group moral right? It relates in two ways. The first is the connection to the group versus individual rights arguments I have advanced in this paper. I believe these arguments have cast doubts on the credibility of group moral rights. Primary among these arguments is the one springing from the need for individuals to exercise a group right. It is overly complex and hard to demonstrate how individuals can act both on individual and group moral rights. A more likely portrayal is for the individual, acting through enlightened self interest, to act for a collective out of their own intuitive understanding of the individual moral needs of the group.

The second relationship to the question is the essential group nature of secession itself. Secession is by nature group oriented. There is no individual nature to secession whatsoever. To secede from a group, nation, or state implies a taking of territory, wealth, or resource. These are meaningless acts as performed by an individual, especially within a system that recognizes individual ownership rights. Buchanan, and others, have made this group connection even stronger by associating secession with minority rights.<sup>21</sup> Given this essential group nature, and the ill advisability of group moral rights, is there a need or role for secession?

Let me reaffirm that secession is a group activity, but it is void of moral content. Only in individuals do we have a moral component. In the realm of national sovereignty when individuals exert their moral right to change their government outside of normal channels it is called revolution. It is this changing of the political system that is an essential part of the definition of revolution. Secession is the group equivalent of revolution without the moral component. Secession is supposedly void of this political change component, i.e. no one is seeking to overthrow the government, they are only seeking to leave. However, I argue that this is an impossibility. There is no logical expectation, outside of a legally defined right to secede, that a group can break covenant, take land, wealth or other resource without impacting dramatically the political order.

In other words, secession has a moral impact without having a moral component. This flies in the face of my earlier arguments that you can not have moral consequences without individual accountability. We can realize the needed accountability if we will recognize secession as the variant of revolution that it really is. Individuals start revolutions, but the number of individuals needed is irrelevant. Revolutions can start with one individual, or with one million individuals acting together. But regardless of the number there is the essential individual commitment and the individual accountability. This same accountability is brought to secession as a variant of revolution.

**Only individuals can begin a process - revolution - to change the political order. Secession is a variant of this process. While the American South made it's stated intention to secede from the union it can be argued that this was really a revolution. One argument to support this can be made according to the reactions of the North and in particular Lincoln. President Lincoln argued forcibly that the union must be preserved, even though there was no explicit reason to do so. The South was not a wealthy region<sup>22</sup> and did not take land in states that did not vote to join the Confederacy. Yet the Union went to war to preserve the nation's integrity. Even the slavery issue was not cited until after the war began as an issue in why the war was being fought. The argument can be made that this secession by the South was perceived as a threat to the political order, i.e. as revolution.**

**Secession is not of it's own nature a moral right. This is true, as I have argued, to it's nature as a group moral right, because group moral rights are problematic and an unnecessary extension of the right's discussion. And this is true as to its individual rights nature as well. Secession is not an individual moral right because it by definition includes separation of territory, wealth or resource, done of which can be done morally by an individual. It does, however, fall under the heading of revolution as a variant of that individual moral right, including as it does, by its effect, an unavoidable change to the political order. And gaining in this variant role by the individual moral accountability that revolution entails.**

### **Conclusion**

**I have in this paper made an argument for the problematic nature of group moral rights. I have argued that group rights are derived from the historic patterns of individual moral rights, and that legal rights are more likely the nature of group claims. I have argued against secession as a moral right and have presented the case for it as a variant of revolution. All of these arguments maintain the key element of individual moral accountability.**

**Buchanan, and other liberal writers, are undoubtedly, with their theories on secession, trying to explain a growing movement in the latter part of this century. However, a majority of the cases can be explained using contract law concepts, without the need to generate a questionable series of rights based on collectives. This is true especially for cases like the former Soviet Union which were coerced unions in their inception. Those cases that do not easily fit the contract law criteria can be explained under the rubric of revolution. While secessionary movements will obviously continue, it is unnecessary to refer to group moral rights for their explanation. Revolution continues to convey the correct mix of rights and accountability.**

### **Footnotes**

**1Allen E. Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to Secede"(1992) Journal of International Affairs 347-365**

**2**Allen E. Buchanan, *Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991)

**3**J. Angelo Corlett, "The Problem of Collective Moral Rights" (1994) *Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence* 237-259

**4***Ibid.* at 243

**5***Ibid.* at 245

**6**Buchanan, *Secession*, 74 (italics are mine)

**7**Buchanan, *Secession*, 75

**8**Arthur Linton Corbin, *Corbin on Contracts* (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1952) 3-4.

**9**W.E.Vine, *Vine's Expository Dictionary of New Testament Words*, (Nashville, TN: Royal Publishers, Inc.) 1939

**10**Corbin, *Corbin on Contracts*, 923

**11***Ibid.* at 924

**12***Ibid.* at 924

**13**Buchanan, *Secession*, 27

**14**Buchanan, *Secession*, 29-74

**15**Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to Secede", 353-358

**16**Buchanan, *Secession*, 74

**17**"Self-Determination and the Right to Secede", Buchanan, 354

**18** Buchanan, *Secession*, 41

**19**Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to Secede", 353

**20** Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to Secede", 353

**21**Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to Secede", 349

**22**Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to Secede", 357