FEDERALIST No. 9

The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and

liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and

insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty

republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror

and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually

agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they

were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of

tyranny and anarchy. If they exhibit occasional calms, these only

serve as short-lived contrast to the furious storms that are to

succeed. If now and then intervals of felicity open to view, we

behold them with a mixture of regret, arising from the reflection

that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the

tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of

glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a

transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time admonish us

to lament that the vices of government should pervert the direction

and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted

endowments for which the favored soils that produced them have been

so justly celebrated.

From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics

the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against

the forms of republican government, but against the very principles

of civil liberty. They have decried all free government as

inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulged themselves

in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans. Happily for

mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty, which

have flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious instances, refuted

their gloomy sophisms. And, I trust, America will be the broad and

solid foundation of other edifices, not less magnificent, which will

be equally permanent monuments of their errors.

But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched

of republican government were too just copies of the originals from

which they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have

devised models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends

to liberty would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that

species of government as indefensible. The science of politics,

however, like most other sciences, has received great improvement.

The efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which

were either not known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients.

The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the

introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institution of

courts composed of judges holding their offices during good

behavior; the representation of the people in the legislature by

deputies of their own election: these are wholly new discoveries,

or have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern

times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellences

of republican government may be retained and its imperfections

lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances that tend

to the amelioration of popular systems of civil government, I shall

venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one more, on a

principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the

new Constitution; I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which

such systems are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of

a single State or to the consolidation of several smaller States

into one great Confederacy. The latter is that which immediately

concerns the object under consideration. It will, however, be of

use to examine the principle in its application to a single State,

which shall be attended to in another place.

The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction and to

guard the internal tranquillity of States, as to increase their

external force and security, is in reality not a new idea. It has

been practiced upon in different countries and ages, and has

received the sanction of the most approved writers on the subject of

politics. The opponents of the plan proposed have, with great

assiduity, cited and circulated the observations of Montesquieu on

the necessity of a contracted territory for a republican government.

But they seem not to have been apprised of the sentiments of that

great man expressed in another part of his work, nor to have

adverted to the consequences of the principle to which they

subscribe with such ready acquiescence.

When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the

standards he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits

of almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia,

Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia

can by any means be compared with the models from which he reasoned

and to which the terms of his description apply. If we therefore

take his ideas on this point as the criterion of truth, we shall be

driven to the alternative either of taking refuge at once in the

arms of monarchy, or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of

little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched

nurseries of unceasing discord, and the miserable objects of

universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers who have come

forward on the other side of the question seem to have been aware of

the dilemma; and have even been bold enough to hint at the division

of the larger States as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated

policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by the multiplication of

petty offices, answer the views of men who possess not

qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles

of personal intrigue, but it could never promote the greatness or

happiness of the people of America.

Referring the examination of the principle itself to another

place, as has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to

remark here that, in the sense of the author who has been most

emphatically quoted upon the occasion, it would only dictate a

reduction of the SIZE of the more considerable MEMBERS of the Union,

but would not militate against their being all comprehended in one

confederate government. And this is the true question, in the

discussion of which we are at present interested.

So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in

opposition to a general Union of the States, that he explicitly

treats of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC as the expedient for extending the

sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advantages of

monarchy with those of republicanism.

``It is very probable,'' (says he1) ``that mankind would

have been obliged at length to live constantly under the government

of a single person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution

that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with

the external force of a monarchical government. I mean a

CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC.

``This form of government is a convention by which several

smaller STATES agree to become members of a larger ONE, which they

intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies that

constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by means of new

associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be

able to provide for the security of the united body.

``A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force,

may support itself without any internal corruptions. The form of

this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.

``If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme

authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and

credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too great

influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a

part, that which would still remain free might oppose him with

forces independent of those which he had usurped and overpower him

before he could be settled in his usurpation.

``Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate

states the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into

one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state

may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy

may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.

``As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys

the internal happiness of each; and with respect to its external

situation, it is possessed, by means of the association, of all the

advantages of large monarchies.''

I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting

passages, because they contain a luminous abridgment of the

principal arguments in favor of the Union, and must effectually

remove the false impressions which a misapplication of other parts

of the work was calculated to make. They have, at the same time, an

intimate connection with the more immediate design of this paper;

which is, to illustrate the tendency of the Union to repress

domestic faction and insurrection.

A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised

between a CONFEDERACY and a CONSOLIDATION of the States. The

essential characteristic of the first is said to be, the restriction

of its authority to the members in their collective capacities,

without reaching to the individuals of whom they are composed. It

is contended that the national council ought to have no concern with

any object of internal administration. An exact equality of

suffrage between the members has also been insisted upon as a

leading feature of a confederate government. These positions are,

in the main, arbitrary; they are supported neither by principle nor

precedent. It has indeed happened, that governments of this kind

have generally operated in the manner which the distinction taken

notice of, supposes to be inherent in their nature; but there have

been in most of them extensive exceptions to the practice, which

serve to prove, as far as example will go, that there is no absolute

rule on the subject. And it will be clearly shown in the course of

this investigation that as far as the principle contended for has

prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable disorder and

imbecility in the government.

The definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be ``an

assemblage of societies,'' or an association of two or more states

into one state. The extent, modifications, and objects of the

federal authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as the

separate organization of the members be not abolished; so long as

it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for local purposes;

though it should be in perfect subordination to the general

authority of the union, it would still be, in fact and in theory, an

association of states, or a confederacy. The proposed Constitution,

so far from implying an abolition of the State governments, makes

them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them

a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves in their

possession certain exclusive and very important portions of

sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every rational import

of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.

In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three

CITIES or republics, the largest were entitled to THREE votes in the

COMMON COUNCIL, those of the middle class to TWO, and the smallest

to ONE. The COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges

and magistrates of the respective CITIES. This was certainly the

most, delicate species of interference in their internal

administration; for if there be any thing that seems exclusively

appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is the appointment of

their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this association,

says: ``Were I to give a model of an excellent Confederate

Republic, it would be that of Lycia.'' Thus we perceive that the

distinctions insisted upon were not within the contemplation of this

enlightened civilian; and we shall be led to conclude, that they

are the novel refinements of an erroneous theory.

PUBLIUS.

1 ``Spirit of Lawa,'' vol. i., book ix., chap. i.