FEDERALIST No. 85

Concluding Remarks

From MCLEAN's Edition, New York.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

ACCORDING to the formal division of the subject of these papers,

announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for

discussion two points: ``the analogy of the proposed government to

your own State constitution,'' and ``the additional security which

its adoption will afford to republican government, to liberty, and

to property.'' But these heads have been so fully anticipated and

exhausted in the progress of the work, that it would now scarcely be

possible to do any thing more than repeat, in a more dilated form,

what has been heretofore said, which the advanced stage of the

question, and the time already spent upon it, conspire to forbid.

It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of the

convention to the act which organizes the government of this State

holds, not less with regard to many of the supposed defects, than to

the real excellences of the former. Among the pretended defects are

the re-eligibility of the Executive, the want of a council, the

omission of a formal bill of rights, the omission of a provision

respecting the liberty of the press. These and several others which

have been noted in the course of our inquiries are as much

chargeable on the existing constitution of this State, as on the one

proposed for the Union; and a man must have slender pretensions to

consistency, who can rail at the latter for imperfections which he

finds no difficulty in excusing in the former. Nor indeed can there

be a better proof of the insincerity and affectation of some of the

zealous adversaries of the plan of the convention among us, who

profess to be the devoted admirers of the government under which

they live, than the fury with which they have attacked that plan,

for matters in regard to which our own constitution is equally or

perhaps more vulnerable.

The additional securities to republican government, to liberty

and to property, to be derived from the adoption of the plan under

consideration, consist chiefly in the restraints which the

preservation of the Union will impose on local factions and

insurrections, and on the ambition of powerful individuals in single

States, who may acquire credit and influence enough, from leaders

and favorites, to become the despots of the people; in the

diminution of the opportunities to foreign intrigue, which the

dissolution of the Confederacy would invite and facilitate; in the

prevention of extensive military establishments, which could not

fail to grow out of wars between the States in a disunited

situation; in the express guaranty of a republican form of

government to each; in the absolute and universal exclusion of

titles of nobility; and in the precautions against the repetition

of those practices on the part of the State governments which have

undermined the foundations of property and credit, have planted

mutual distrust in the breasts of all classes of citizens, and have

occasioned an almost universal prostration of morals.

Thus have I, fellow-citizens, executed the task I had assigned

to myself; with what success, your conduct must determine. I trust

at least you will admit that I have not failed in the assurance I

gave you respecting the spirit with which my endeavors should be

conducted. I have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and

have studiously avoided those asperities which are too apt to

disgrace political disputants of all parties, and which have been

not a little provoked by the language and conduct of the opponents

of the Constitution. The charge of a conspiracy against the

liberties of the people, which has been indiscriminately brought

against the advocates of the plan, has something in it too wanton

and too malignant, not to excite the indignation of every man who

feels in his own bosom a refutation of the calumny. The perpetual

changes which have been rung upon the wealthy, the well-born, and

the great, have been such as to inspire the disgust of all sensible

men. And the unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentations

which have been in various ways practiced to keep the truth from the

public eye, have been of a nature to demand the reprobation of all

honest men. It is not impossible that these circumstances may have

occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of expression which I

did not intend; it is certain that I have frequently felt a

struggle between sensibility and moderation; and if the former has

in some instances prevailed, it must be my excuse that it has been

neither often nor much.

Let us now pause and ask ourselves whether, in the course of

these papers, the proposed Constitution has not been satisfactorily

vindicated from the aspersions thrown upon it; and whether it has

not been shown to be worthy of the public approbation, and necessary

to the public safety and prosperity. Every man is bound to answer

these questions to himself, according to the best of his conscience

and understanding, and to act agreeably to the genuine and sober

dictates of his judgment. This is a duty from which nothing can

give him a dispensation. 'T is one that he is called upon, nay,

constrained by all the obligations that form the bands of society,

to discharge sincerely and honestly. No partial motive, no

particular interest, no pride of opinion, no temporary passion or

prejudice, will justify to himself, to his country, or to his

posterity, an improper election of the part he is to act. Let him

beware of an obstinate adherence to party; let him reflect that the

object upon which he is to decide is not a particular interest of

the community, but the very existence of the nation; and let him

remember that a majority of America has already given its sanction

to the plan which he is to approve or reject.

I shall not dissemble that I feel an entire confidence in the

arguments which recommend the proposed system to your adoption, and

that I am unable to discern any real force in those by which it has

been opposed. I am persuaded that it is the best which our

political situation, habits, and opinions will admit, and superior

to any the revolution has produced.

Concessions on the part of the friends of the plan, that it has

not a claim to absolute perfection, have afforded matter of no small

triumph to its enemies. ``Why,'' say they, ``should we adopt an

imperfect thing? Why not amend it and make it perfect before it is

irrevocably established?'' This may be plausible enough, but it is

only plausible. In the first place I remark, that the extent of

these concessions has been greatly exaggerated. They have been

stated as amounting to an admission that the plan is radically

defective, and that without material alterations the rights and the

interests of the community cannot be safely confided to it. This,

as far as I have understood the meaning of those who make the

concessions, is an entire perversion of their sense. No advocate of

the measure can be found, who will not declare as his sentiment,

that the system, though it may not be perfect in every part, is,

upon the whole, a good one; is the best that the present views and

circumstances of the country will permit; and is such an one as

promises every species of security which a reasonable people can

desire.

I answer in the next place, that I should esteem it the extreme

of imprudence to prolong the precarious state of our national

affairs, and to expose the Union to the jeopardy of successive

experiments, in the chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan. I never

expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man. The result of the

deliberations of all collective bodies must necessarily be a

compound, as well of the errors and prejudices, as of the good sense

and wisdom, of the individuals of whom they are composed. The

compacts which are to embrace thirteen distinct States in a common

bond of amity and union, must as necessarily be a compromise of as

many dissimilar interests and inclinations. How can perfection

spring from such materials?

The reasons assigned in an excellent little pamphlet lately

published in this city,1 are unanswerable to show the utter

improbability of assembling a new convention, under circumstances in

any degree so favorable to a happy issue, as those in which the late

convention met, deliberated, and concluded. I will not repeat the

arguments there used, as I presume the production itself has had an

extensive circulation. It is certainly well worthy the perusal of

every friend to his country. There is, however, one point of light

in which the subject of amendments still remains to be considered,

and in which it has not yet been exhibited to public view. I cannot

resolve to conclude without first taking a survey of it in this

aspect.

It appears to me susceptible of absolute demonstration, that it

will be far more easy to obtain subsequent than previous amendments

to the Constitution. The moment an alteration is made in the

present plan, it becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one, and

must undergo a new decision of each State. To its complete

establishment throughout the Union, it will therefore require the

concurrence of thirteen States. If, on the contrary, the

Constitution proposed should once be ratified by all the States as

it stands, alterations in it may at any time be effected by nine

States. Here, then, the chances are as thirteen to nine2 in

favor of subsequent amendment, rather than of the original adoption

of an entire system.

This is not all. Every Constitution for the United States must

inevitably consist of a great variety of particulars, in which

thirteen independent States are to be accommodated in their

interests or opinions of interest. We may of course expect to see,

in any body of men charged with its original formation, very

different combinations of the parts upon different points. Many of

those who form a majority on one question, may become the minority

on a second, and an association dissimilar to either may constitute

the majority on a third. Hence the necessity of moulding and

arranging all the particulars which are to compose the whole, in

such a manner as to satisfy all the parties to the compact; and

hence, also, an immense multiplication of difficulties and

casualties in obtaining the collective assent to a final act. The

degree of that multiplication must evidently be in a ratio to the

number of particulars and the number of parties.

But every amendment to the Constitution, if once established,

would be a single proposition, and might be brought forward singly.

There would then be no necessity for management or compromise, in

relation to any other point no giving nor taking. The will of the

requisite number would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue.

And consequently, whenever nine, or rather ten States, were united

in the desire of a particular amendment, that amendment must

infallibly take place. There can, therefore, be no comparison

between the facility of affecting an amendment, and that of

establishing in the first instance a complete Constitution.

In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it

has been urged that the persons delegated to the administration of

the national government will always be disinclined to yield up any

portion of the authority of which they were once possessed. For my

own part I acknowledge a thorough conviction that any amendments

which may, upon mature consideration, be thought useful, will be

applicable to the organization of the government, not to the mass of

its powers; and on this account alone, I think there is no weight

in the observation just stated. I also think there is little weight

in it on another account. The intrinsic difficulty of governing

thirteen States at any rate, independent of calculations upon an

ordinary degree of public spirit and integrity, will, in my opinion

constantly impose on the national rulers the necessity of a spirit

of accommodation to the reasonable expectations of their

constituents. But there is yet a further consideration, which

proves beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the observation is

futile. It is this that the national rulers, whenever nine States

concur, will have no option upon the subject. By the fifth article

of the plan, the Congres will be obliged ``on the application of the

legislatures of two thirds of the States Uwhich at present amount to

ninee, to call a convention for proposing amendments, which shall be

valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution,

when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the States, or

by conventions in three fourths thereof.'' The words of this

article are peremptory. The Congress ``shall call a convention.''

Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body.

And of consequence, all the declamation about the disinclination to

a change vanishes in air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed

to unite two thirds or three fourths of the State legislatures, in

amendments which may affect local interests, can there be any room

to apprehend any such difficulty in a union on points which are

merely relative to the general liberty or security of the people.

We may safely rely on the disposition of the State legislatures to

erect barriers against the encroachments of the national authority.

If the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain it is that I am

myself deceived by it, for it is, in my conception, one of those

rare instances in which a political truth can be brought to the test

of a mathematical demonstration. Those who see the matter in the

same light with me, however zealous they may be for amendments, must

agree in the propriety of a previous adoption, as the most direct

road to their own object.

The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the establishment of

the Constitution, must abate in every man who is ready to accede to

the truth of the following observations of a writer equally solid

and ingenious: ``To balance a large state or society Usays hee,

whether monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so

great difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehensive, is

able, by the mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it. The

judgments of many must unite in the work; experience must guide

their labor; time must bring it to perfection, and the feeling of

inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they INEVITABLY fall

into in their first trials and experiments.''3 These judicious

reflections contain a lesson of moderation to all the sincere lovers

of the Union, and ought to put them upon their guard against

hazarding anarchy, civil war, a perpetual alienation of the States

from each other, and perhaps the military despotism of a victorious

demagogue, in the pursuit of what they are not likely to obtain, but

from time and experience. It may be in me a defect of political

fortitude, but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain an equal

tranquillity with those who affect to treat the dangers of a longer

continuance in our present situation as imaginary. A nation,

without a national government, is, in my view, an awful spectacle.

The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by

the voluntary ocnsent of a whole people, is a prodigy, to the

completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety. I can

reconcile it to no rules of prudence to let go the hold we now have,

in so arduous an enterprise, upon seven out of the thirteen States,

and after having passed over so considerable a part of the ground,

to recommence the course. I dread the more the consequences of new

attempts, because I know that powerful individuals, in this and in

other States, are enemies to a general national government in every

possible shape.

PUBLIUS.

1 Entitled ``An Address to the People of the State of New

York.''

2 It may rather be said TEN, for though two thirds may set on

foot the measure, three fourths must ratify.

3 Hume's ``Essays,'' vol. i., page 128: ``The Rise of Arts and

Sciences.''