FEDERALIST No. 70

The Executive Department Further Considered

From the New York Packet.

Tuesday, March 18, 1788.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a

vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican

government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of

government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of

foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the

same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles.

Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of

good government. It is essential to the protection of the community

against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady

administration of the laws; to the protection of property against

those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes

interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of

liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of

faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman

story, knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in

the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of

Dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who

aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the

community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government,

as against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the

conquest and destruction of Rome.

There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples

on this head. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the

government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad

execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in

theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.

Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will

agree in the necessity of an energetic Executive, it will only

remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this

energy? How far can they be combined with those other ingredients

which constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far does

this combination characterize the plan which has been reported by

the convention?

The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are,

first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision

for its support; fourthly, competent powers.

The ingredients which constitute safety in the repub lican sense

are, first, a due dependence on the people, secondly, a due

responsibility.

Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most

celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justice

of their views, have declared in favor of a single Executive and a

numerous legislature. They have with great propriety, considered

energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have

regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand, while

they have, with equal propriety, considered the latter as best

adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to

conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their

privileges and interests.

That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed.

Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally

characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent

degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in

proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be

diminished.

This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the

power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or

by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part,

to the control and co-operation of others, in the capacity of

counsellors to him. Of the first, the two Consuls of Rome may serve

as an example; of the last, we shall find examples in the

constitutions of several of the States. New York and New Jersey, if

I recollect right, are the only States which have intrusted the

executive authority wholly to single men.1 Both these methods

of destroying the unity of the Executive have their partisans; but

the votaries of an executive council are the most numerous. They

are both liable, if not to equal, to similar objections, and may in

most lights be examined in conjunction.

The experience of other nations will afford little instruction

on this head. As far, however, as it teaches any thing, it teaches

us not to be enamoured of plurality in the Executive. We have seen

that the Achaeans, on an experiment of two Praetors, were induced to

abolish one. The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs

to the republic from the dissensions between the Consuls, and

between the military Tribunes, who were at times substituted for the

Consuls. But it gives us no specimens of any peculiar advantages

derived to the state from the circumstance of the plurality of those

magistrates. That the dissensions between them were not more

frequent or more fatal, is a matter of astonishment, until we advert

to the singular position in which the republic was almost

continually placed, and to the prudent policy pointed out by the

circumstances of the state, and pursued by the Consuls, of making a

division of the government between them. The patricians engaged in

a perpetual struggle with the plebeians for the preservation of

their ancient authorities and dignities; the Consuls, who were

generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united by the

personal interest they had in the defense of the privileges of their

order. In addition to this motive of union, after the arms of the

republic had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it

became an established custom with the Consuls to divide the

administration between themselves by lot one of them remaining at

Rome to govern the city and its environs, the other taking the

command in the more distant provinces. This expedient must, no

doubt, have had great influence in preventing those collisions and

rivalships which might otherwise have embroiled the peace of the

republic.

But quitting the dim light of historical research, attaching

ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and good se se, we shall

discover much greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of

plurality in the Executive, under any modification whatever.

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common

enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of

opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are

clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger

of personal emulation and even animosity. From either, and

especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions are

apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the

respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and

operation of those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately

assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of

a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most

important measures of the government, in the most critical

emergencies of the state. And what is still worse, they might split

the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions,

adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the

magistracy.

Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have had no agency

in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom

they dislike. But if they have been consulted, and have happened to

disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an

indispensable duty of self-love. They seem to think themselves

bound in honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility, to

defeat the success of what has been resolved upon contrary to their

sentiments. Men of upright, benevolent tempers have too many

opportunities of remarking, with horror, to what desperate lengths

this disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great

interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit,

and to the obstinacy of individuals, who have credit enough to make

their passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps

the question now before the public may, in its consequences, afford

melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or

rather detestable vice, in the human character.

Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from

the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the

formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore

unwise, to introduce them into the constitution of the Executive.

It is here too that they may be most pernicious. In the

legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a

benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in

that department of the government, though they may sometimes

obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and

circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority. When a

resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end.

That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no

favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of

dissension in the executive department. Here, they are pure and

unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They

serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure

to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of

it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive

which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition, vigor

and expedition, and this without anycounterbalancing good. In the

conduct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark

of the national security, every thing would be to be apprehended

from its plurality.

It must be confessed that these observations apply with

principal weight to the first case supposed that is, to a plurality

of magistrates of equal dignity and authority a scheme, the

advocates for which are not likely to form a numerous sect; but

they apply, though not with equal, yet with considerable weight to

the project of a council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally

necessary to the operations of the ostensible Executive. An artful

cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the

whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist, the

mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to

tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of

habitual feebleness and dilatoriness.

But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the

Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first

plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility.

Responsibility is of two kinds to censure and to punishment. The

first is the more important of the two, especially in an elective

office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a

manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than

in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But

the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of

detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst

mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment

of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought

really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much

dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public

opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The

circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or

misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a

number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of

agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been

mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose

account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.

``I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in

their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better

resolution on the point.'' These and similar pretexts are

constantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there that

will either take the trouble or incur the odium, of a strict

scrunity into the secret springs of the transaction? Should there

be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task,

if there happen to be collusion between the parties concerned, how

easy it is to clothe the circumstances with so much ambiguity, as to

render it uncertain what was the precise conduct of any of those

parties?

In the single instance in which the governor of this State is

coupled with a council that is, in the appointment to offices, we

have seen the mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration.

Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made. Some

cases, indeed, have been so flagrant that ALL PARTIES have agreed in

the impropriety of the thing. When inquiry has been made, the blame

has been laid by the governor on the members of the council, who, on

their part, have charged it upon his nomination; while the people

remain altogether at a loss to determine, by whose influence their

interests have been committed to hands so unqualified and so

manifestly improper. In tenderness to individuals, I forbear to

descend to particulars.

It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of

the Executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest

securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated

power, first, the restraints of public opinion, which lose their

efficacy, as well on account of the division of the censure

attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the

uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, secondly, the

opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the

misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their

removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases which

admit of it.

In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a

maxim which has obtained for the sake of the pub lic peace, that he

is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred.

Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that kingdom, than to annex to

the king a constitutional council, who may be responsible to the

nation for the advice they give. Without this, there would be no

responsibility whatever in the executive department an idea

inadmissible in a free government. But even there the king is not

bound by the resolutions of his council, though they are answerable

for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his own

conduct in the exercise of his office, and may observe or disregard

the counsel given to him at his sole discretion.

But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally

responsible for his behavior in office the reason which in the

British Constitution dictates the propriety of a council, not only

ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy

of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited

responsibility of the chief magistrate, which serves in some degree

as a hostage to the national justice for his good behavior. In the

American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would greatly

diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief

Magistrate himself.

The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally

obtained in the State constitutions, has been derived from that

maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the

hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should

be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the

advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous

disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at

all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion,

in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius

pronounces to be ``deep, solid, and ingenious,'' that ``the

executive power is more easily confined when it is ONE'';2 that

it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy

and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all

multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to

liberty.

A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of

security sought for in the multiplication of the Executive, is

nattainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination

difficult, or they are rather a source of danger than of security.

The united credit and influence of several individuals must be more

formidable to liberty, than the credit and influence of either of

them separately. When power, therefore, is placed in the hands of

so small a number of men, as to admit of their interests and views

being easily combined in a common enterprise, by an artful leader,

it becomes more liable to abuse, and more dangerous when abused,

than if it be lodged in the hands of one man; who, from the very

circumstance of his being alone, will be more narrowly watched and

more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of

influence as when he is associated with others. The Decemvirs of

Rome, whose name denotes their number,3 were more to be dreaded

in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have been. No person

would think of proposing an Executive much more numerous than that

body; from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of the

council. The extreme of these numbers, is not too great for an easy

combination; and from such a combination America would have more to

fear, than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to

a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are

generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are

often the instruments and accomplices of his bad and are almost

always a cloak to his faults.

I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; though it be

evident that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the

principal end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the

members, who must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of

government, would form an item in the catalogue of public

expenditures too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal

utility. I will only add that, prior to the appearance of the

Constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent man from any of the

States, who did not admit, as the result of experience, that the

UNITY of the executive of this State was one of the best of the

distinguishing features of our constitution.

PUBLIUS.

1 New York has no council except for the single purpose of

appointing to offices; New Jersey has a council whom the governor

may consult. But I think, from the terms of the constitution, their

resolutions do not bind him.

2 De Lolme.

3 Ten.