FEDERALIST. No. 63

The Senate Continued

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON OR MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

A FIFTH desideratum, illustrating the utility of a senate, is

the want of a due sense of national character. Without a select and

stable member of the government, the esteem of foreign powers will

not only be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy,

proceeding from the causes already mentioned, but the national

councils will not possess that sensibility to the opinion of the

world, which is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit, than

it is to obtain, its respect and confidence.

An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to

every government for two reasons: the one is, that, independently

of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on

various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the

offspring of a wise and honorable policy; the second is, that in

doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be

warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or

known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can

be followed. What has not America lost by her want of character

with foreign nations; and how many errors and follies would she not

have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures had, in

every instance, been previously tried by the light in which they

would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind?

Yet however requisite a sense of national character may be, it

is evident that it can never be sufficiently possessed by a numerous

and changeable body. It can only be found in a number so small that

a sensible degree of the praise and blame of public measures may be

the portion of each individual; or in an assembly so durably

invested with public trust, that the pride and consequence of its

members may be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and

prosperity of the community. The half-yearly representatives of

Rhode Island would probably have been little affected in their

deliberations on the iniquitous measures of that State, by arguments

drawn from the light in which such measures would be viewed by

foreign nations, or even by the sister States; whilst it can

scarcely be doubted that if the concurrence of a select and stable

body had been necessary, a regard to national character alone would

have prevented the calamities under which that misguided people is

now laboring.

I add, as a SIXTH defect the want, in some important cases, of a

due responsibility in the government to the people, arising from

that frequency of elections which in other cases produces this

responsibility. This remark will, perhaps, appear not only new, but

paradoxical. It must nevertheless be acknowledged, when explained,

to be as undeniable as it is important.

Responsibility, in order to be reasonable, must be limited to

objects within the power of the responsible party, and in order to

be effectual, must relate to operations of that power, of which a

ready and proper judgment can be formed by the constituents. The

objects of government may be divided into two general classes: the

one depending on measures which have singly an immediate and

sensible operation; the other depending on a succession of

well-chosen and well-connected measures, which have a gradual and

perhaps unobserved operation. The importance of the latter

description to the collective and permanent welfare of every

country, needs no explanation. And yet it is evident that an

assembly elected for so short a term as to be unable to provide more

than one or two links in a chain of measures, on which the general

welfare may essentially depend, ought not to be answerable for the

final result, any more than a steward or tenant, engaged for one

year, could be justly made to answer for places or improvements

which could not be accomplished in less than half a dozen years.

Nor is it possible for the people to estimate the SHARE of

influence which their annual assemblies may respectively have on

events resulting from the mixed transactions of several years. It

is sufficiently difficult to preserve a personal responsibility in

the members of a NUMEROUS body, for such acts of the body as have an

immediate, detached, and palpable operation on its constituents.

The proper remedy for this defect must be an additional body in

the legislative department, which, having sufficient permanency to

provide for such objects as require a continued attention, and a

train of measures, may be justly and effectually answerable for the

attainment of those objects.

Thus far I have considered the circumstances which point out the

necessity of a well-constructed Senate only as they relate to the

representatives of the people. To a people as little blinded by

prejudice or corrupted by flattery as those whom I address, I shall

not scruple to add, that such an institution may be sometimes

necessary as a defense to the people against their own temporary

errors and delusions. As the cool and deliberate sense of the

community ought, in all governments, and actually will, in all free

governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers; so

there are particular moments in public affairs when the people,

stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or

misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call

for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready

to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will

be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of

citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the

blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason,

justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind?

What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often

escaped if their government had contained so provident a safeguard

against the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might

then have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same

citizens the hemlock on one day and statues on the next.

It may be suggested, that a people spread over an extensive

region cannot, like the crowded inhabitants of a small district, be

subject to the infection of violent passions, or to the danger of

combining in pursuit of unjust measures. I am far from denying that

this is a distinction of peculiar importance. I have, on the

contrary, endeavored in a former paper to show, that it is one of

the principal recommendations of a confederated republic. At the

same time, this advantage ought not to be considered as superseding

the use of auxiliary precautions. It may even be remarked, that the

same extended situation, which will exempt the people of America

from some of the dangers incident to lesser republics, will expose

them to the inconveniency of remaining for a longer time under the

influence of those misrepresentations which the combined industry of

interested men may succeed in distributing among them.

It adds no small weight to all these considerations, to

recollect that history informs us of no long-lived republic which

had not a senate. Sparta, Rome, and Carthage are, in fact, the only

states to whom that character can be applied. In each of the two

first there was a senate for life. The constitution of the senate

in the last is less known. Circumstantial evidence makes it

probable that it was not different in this particular from the two

others. It is at least certain, that it had some quality or other

which rendered it an anchor against popular fluctuations; and that

a smaller council, drawn out of the senate, was appointed not only

for life, but filled up vacancies itself. These examples, though as

unfit for the imitation, as they are repugnant to the genius, of

America, are, notwithstanding, when compared with the fugitive and

turbulent existence of other ancient republics, very instructive

proofs of the necessity of some institution that will blend

stability with liberty. I am not unaware of the circumstances which

distinguish the American from other popular governments, as well

ancient as modern; and which render extreme circumspection

necessary, in reasoning from the one case to the other. But after

allowing due weight to this consideration, it may still be

maintained, that there are many points of similitude which render

these examples not unworthy of our attention. Many of the defects,

as we have seen, which can only be supplied by a senatorial

institution, are common to a numerous assembly frequently elected by

the people, and to the people themselves. There are others peculiar

to the former, which require the control of such an institution.

The people can never wilfully betray their own interests; but they

may possibly be betrayed by the representatives of the people; and

the danger will be evidently greater where the whole legislative

trust is lodged in the hands of one body of men, than where the

concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is required in every

public act.

The difference most relied on, between the American and other

republics, consists in the principle of representation; which is

the pivot on which the former move, and which is supposed to have

been unknown to the latter, or at least to the ancient part of them.

The use which has been made of this difference, in reasonings

contained in former papers, will have shown that I am disposed

neither to deny its existence nor to undervalue its importance. I

feel the less restraint, therefore, in observing, that the position

concerning the ignorance of the ancient governments on the subject

of representation, is by no means precisely true in the latitude

commonly given to it. Without entering into a disquisition which

here would be misplaced, I will refer to a few known facts, in

support of what I advance.

In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of the executive

functions were performed, not by the people themselves, but by

officers elected by the people, and REPRESENTING the people in their

EXECUTIVE capacity.

Prior to the reform of Solon, Athens was governed by nine

Archons, annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE AT LARGE. The degree of

power delegated to them seems to be left in great obscurity.

Subsequent to that period, we find an assembly, first of four, and

afterwards of six hundred members, annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE;

and PARTIALLY representing them in their LEGISLATIVE capacity,

since they were not only associated with the people in the function

of making laws, but had the exclusive right of originating

legislative propositions to the people. The senate of Carthage,

also, whatever might be its power, or the duration of its

appointment, appears to have been ELECTIVE by the suffrages of the

people. Similar instances might be traced in most, if not all the

popular governments of antiquity.

Lastly, in Sparta we meet with the Ephori, and in Rome with the

Tribunes; two bodies, small indeed in numbers, but annually ELECTED

BY THE WHOLE BODY OF THE PEOPLE, and considered as the

REPRESENTATIVES of the people, almost in their PLENIPOTENTIARY

capacity. The Cosmi of Crete were also annually ELECTED BY THE

PEOPLE, and have been considered by some authors as an institution

analogous to those of Sparta and Rome, with this difference only,

that in the election of that representative body the right of

suffrage was communicated to a part only of the people.

From these facts, to which many others might be added, it is

clear that the principle of representation was neither unknown to

the ancients nor wholly overlooked in their political constitutions.

The true distinction between these and the American governments,

lies IN THE TOTAL EXCLUSION OF THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR COLLECTIVE

CAPACITY, from any share in the LATTER, and not in the TOTAL

EXCLUSION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE from the

administration of the FORMER. The distinction, however, thus

qualified, must be admitted to leave a most advantageous superiority

in favor of the United States. But to insure to this advantage its

full effect, we must be careful not to separate it from the other

advantage, of an extensive territory. For it cannot be believed,

that any form of representative government could have succeeded

within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of Greece.

In answer to all these arguments, suggested by reason,

illustrated by examples, and enforced by our own experience, the

jealous adversary of the Constitution will probably content himself

with repeating, that a senate appointed not immediately by the

people, and for the term of six years, must gradually acquire a

dangerous pre-eminence in the government, and finally transform it

into a tyrannical aristocracy.

To this general answer, the general reply ought to be

sufficient, that liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty

as well as by the abuses of power; that there are numerous

instances of the former as well as of the latter; and that the

former, rather than the latter, are apparently most to be

apprehended by the United States. But a more particular reply may

be given.

Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate, it is to

be observed, must in the first place corrupt itself; must next

corrupt the State legislatures; must then corrupt the House of

Representatives; and must finally corrupt the people at large. It

is evident that the Senate must be first corrupted before it can

attempt an establishment of tyranny. Without corrupting the State

legislatures, it cannot prosecute the attempt, because the

periodical change of members would otherwise regenerate the whole

body. Without exerting the means of corruption with equal success

on the House of Representatives, the opposition of that coequal

branch of the government would inevitably defeat the attempt; and

without corrupting the people themselves, a succession of new

representatives would speedily restore all things to their pristine

order. Is there any man who can seriously persuade himself that the

proposed Senate can, by any possible means within the compass of

human address, arrive at the object of a lawless ambition, through

all these obstructions?

If reason condemns the suspicion, the same sentence is

pronounced by experience. The constitution of Maryland furnishes

the most apposite example. The Senate of that State is elected, as

the federal Senate will be, indirectly by the people, and for a term

less by one year only than the federal Senate. It is distinguished,

also, by the remarkable prerogative of filling up its own vacancies

within the term of its appointment, and, at the same time, is not

under the control of any such rotation as is provided for the

federal Senate. There are some other lesser distinctions, which

would expose the former to colorable objections, that do not lie

against the latter. If the federal Senate, therefore, really

contained the danger which has been so loudly proclaimed, some

symptoms at least of a like danger ought by this time to have been

betrayed by the Senate of Maryland, but no such symptoms have

appeared. On the contrary, the jealousies at first entertained by

men of the same description with those who view with terror the

correspondent part of the federal Constitution, have been gradually

extinguished by the progress of the experiment; and the Maryland

constitution is daily deriving, from the salutary operation of this

part of it, a reputation in which it will probably not be rivalled

by that of any State in the Union.

But if any thing could silence the jealousies on this subject,

it ought to be the British example. The Senate there instead of

being elected for a term of six years, and of being unconfined to

particular families or fortunes, is an hereditary assembly of

opulent nobles. The House of Representatives, instead of being

elected for two years, and by the whole body of the people, is

elected for seven years, and, in very great proportion, by a very

small proportion of the people. Here, unquestionably, ought to be

seen in full display the aristocratic usurpations and tyranny which

are at some future period to be exemplified in the United States.

Unfortunately, however, for the anti-federal argument, the British

history informs us that this hereditary assembly has not been able

to defend itself against the continual encroachments of the House of

Representatives; and that it no sooner lost the support of the

monarch, than it was actually crushed by the weight of the popular

branch.

As far as antiquity can instruct us on this subject, its

examples support the reasoning which we have employed. In Sparta,

the Ephori, the annual representatives of the people, were found an

overmatch for the senate for life, continually gained on its

authority and finally drew all power into their own hands. The

Tribunes of Rome, who were the representatives of the people,

prevailed, it is well known, in almost every contest with the senate

for life, and in the end gained the most complete triumph over it.

The fact is the more remarkable, as unanimity was required in every

act of the Tribunes, even after their number was augmented to ten.

It proves the irresistible force possessed by that branch of a free

government, which has the people on its side. To these examples

might be added that of Carthage, whose senate, according to the

testimony of Polybius, instead of drawing all power into its vortex,

had, at the commencement of the second Punic War, lost almost the

whole of its original portion.

Besides the conclusive evidence resulting from this assemblage

of facts, that the federal Senate will never be able to transform

itself, by gradual usurpations, into an independent and aristocratic

body, we are warranted in believing, that if such a revolution

should ever happen from causes which the foresight of man cannot

guard against, the House of Representatives, with the people on

their side, will at all times be able to bring back the Constitution

to its primitive form and principles. Against the force of the

immediate representatives of the people, nothing will be able to

maintain even the constitutional authority of the Senate, but such a

display of enlightened policy, and attachment to the public good, as

will divide with that branch of the legislature the affections and

support of the entire body of the people themselves.

PUBLIUS.