FEDERALIST No. 62

The Senate

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON OR MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

HAVING examined the constitution of the House of

Representatives, and answered such of the objections against it as

seemed to merit notice, I enter next on the examination of the

Senate.

The heads into which this member of the government may be

considered are: I. The qualification of senators; II. The

appointment of them by the State legislatures; III. The equality of

representation in the Senate; IV. The number of senators, and the

term for which they are to be elected; V. The powers vested in the

Senate.

I. The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished

from those of representatives, consist in a more advanced age and a

longer period of citizenship. A senator must be thirty years of age

at least; as a representative must be twenty-five. And the former

must have been a citizen nine years; as seven years are required

for the latter. The propriety of these distinctions is explained by

the nature of the senatorial trust, which, requiring greater extent

of information and tability of character, requires at the same time

that the senator should have reached a period of life most likely to

supply these advantages; and which, participating immediately in

transactions with foreign nations, ought to be exercised by none who

are not thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits

incident to foreign birth and education. The term of nine years

appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total exclusion of

adopted citizens, whose merits and talents may claim a share in the

public confidence, and an indiscriminate and hasty admission of

them, which might create a channel for foreign influence on the

national councils.

II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of

senators by the State legislatures. Among the various modes which

might have been devised for constituting this branch of the

government, that which has been proposed by the convention is

probably the most congenial with the public opinion. It is

recommended by the double advantage of favoring a select

appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an agency

in the formation of the federal government as must secure the

authority of the former, and may form a convenient link between the

two systems.

III. The equality of representation in the Senate is another

point, which, being evidently the result of compromise between the

opposite pretensions of the large and the small States, does not

call for much discussion. If indeed it be right, that among a

people thoroughly incorporated into one nation, every district ought

to have a PROPORTIONAL share in the government, and that among

independent and sovereign States, bound together by a simple league,

the parties, however unequal in size, ought to have an EQUAL share

in the common councils, it does not appear to be without some reason

that in a compound republic, partaking both of the national and

federal character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture

of the principles of proportional and equal representation. But it

is superfluous to try, by the standard of theory, a part of the

Constitution which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not of

theory, but ``of a spirit of amity, and that mutual deference and

concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered

indispensable.'' A common government, with powers equal to its

objects, is called for by the voice, and still more loudly by the

political situation, of America. A government founded on principles

more consonant to the wishes of the larger States, is not likely to

be obtained from the smaller States. The only option, then, for the

former, lies between the proposed government and a government still

more objectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of prudence

must be to embrace the lesser evil; and, instead of indulging a

fruitless anticipation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to

contemplate rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify

the sacrifice.

In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed

to each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion

of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument

for preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality

ought to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small

States; since they are not less solicitous to guard, by every

possible expedient, against an improper consolidation of the States

into one simple republic.

Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the

constitution of the Senate is, the additional impediment it must

prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution

can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of

the people, and then, of a majority of the States. It must be

acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may in some

instances be injurious as well as beneficial; and that the peculiar

defense which it involves in favor of the smaller States, would be

more rational, if any interests common to them, and distinct from

those of the other States, would otherwise be exposed to peculiar

danger. But as the larger States will always be able, by their

power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of this

prerogative of the lesser States, and as the faculty and excess of

law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most

liable, it is not impossible that this part of the Constitution may

be more convenient in practice than it appears to many in

contemplation.

IV. The number of senators, and the duration of their

appointment, come next to be considered. In order to form an

accurate judgment on both of these points, it will be proper to

inquire into the purposes which are to be answered by a senate; and

in order to ascertain these, it will be necessary to review the

inconveniences which a republic must suffer from the want of such an

institution.

First. It is a misfortune incident to republican

government, though in a less degree than to other governments, that

those who administer it may forget their obligations to their

constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In

this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative

assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must

be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the

security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct

bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or

corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient. This is a

precaution founded on such clear principles, and now so well

understood in the United States, that it would be more than

superfluous to enlarge on it. I will barely remark, that as the

improbability of sinister combinations will be in proportion to the

dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, it must be politic to

distinguish them from each other by every circumstance which will

consist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the

genuine principles of republican government.

Secondly. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated

by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to

the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by

factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions.

Examples on this subject might be cited without number; and from

proceedings within the United States, as well as from the history of

other nations. But a position that will not be contradicted, need

not be proved. All that need be remarked is, that a body which is

to correct this infirmity ought itself to be free from it, and

consequently ought to be less numerous. It ought, moreover, to

possess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its authority

by a tenure of considerable duration.

Thirdly. Another defect to be supplied by a senate lies in

a want of due acquaintance with the objects and principles of

legislation. It is not possible that an assembly of men called for

the most part from pursuits of a private nature, continued in

appointment for a short time, and led by no permanent motive to

devote the intervals of public occupation to a study of the laws,

the affairs, and the comprehensive interests of their country,

should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of important

errors in the exercise of their legislative trust. It may be

affirmed, on the best grounds, that no small share of the present

embarrassments of America is to be charged on the blunders of our

governments; and that these have proceeded from the heads rather

than the hearts of most of the authors of them. What indeed are all

the repealing, explaining, and amending laws, which fill and

disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient

wisdom; so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding against

each preceding session; so many admonitions to the people, of the

value of those aids which may be expected from a well-constituted

senate?

A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the

object of government, which is the happiness of the people;

secondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best

attained. Some governments are deficient in both these qualities;

most governments are deficient in the first. I scruple not to

assert, that in American governments too little attention has been

paid to the last. The federal Constitution avoids this error; and

what merits particular notice, it provides for the last in a mode

which increases the security for the first.

Fourthly. The mutability in the public councils arising

from a rapid succession of new members, however qualified they may

be, points out, in the strongest manner, the necessity of some

stable institution in the government. Every new election in the

States is found to change one half of the representatives. From

this change of men must proceed a change of opinions; and from a

change of opinions, a change of measures. But a continual change

even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence

and every prospect of success. The remark is verified in private

life, and becomes more just, as well as more important, in national

transactions.

To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would

fill a volume. I will hint a few only, each of which will be

perceived to be a source of innumerable others.

In the first place, it forfeits the respect and confidence of

other nations, and all the advantages connected with national

character. An individual who is observed to be inconstant to his

plans, or perhaps to carry on his affairs without any plan at all,

is marked at once, by all prudent people, as a speedy victim to his

own unsteadiness and folly. His more friendly neighbors may pity

him, but all will decline to connect their fortunes with his; and

not a few will seize the opportunity of making their fortunes out of

his. One nation is to another what one individual is to another;

with this melancholy distinction perhaps, that the former, with

fewer of the benevolent emotions than the latter, are under fewer

restraints also from taking undue advantage from the indiscretions

of each other. Every nation, consequently, whose affairs betray a

want of wisdom and stability, may calculate on every loss which can

be sustained from the more systematic policy of their wiser

neighbors. But the best instruction on this subject is unhappily

conveyed to America by the example of her own situation. She finds

that she is held in no respect by her friends; that she is the

derision of her enemies; and that she is a prey to every nation

which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils and

embarrassed affairs.

The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more

calamitous. It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be

of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of

their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be

read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be

repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such

incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is to-day, can

guess what it will be to-morrow. Law is defined to be a rule of

action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less

fixed?

Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable

advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the

moneyed few over the industrious and uniformed mass of the people.

Every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue, or in any way

affecting the value of the different species of property, presents a

new harvest to those who watch the change, and can trace its

consequences; a harvest, reared not by themselves, but by the toils

and cares of the great body of their fellow-citizens. This is a

state of things in which it may be said with some truth that laws

are made for the FEW, not for the MANY.

In another point of view, great injury results from an unstable

government. The want of confidence in the public councils damps

every useful undertaking, the success and profit of which may depend

on a continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent merchant

will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of commerce when he knows

not but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be

executed? What farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the

encouragement given to any particular cultivation or establishment,

when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labors and

advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant government?

In a word, no great improvement or laudable enterprise can go

forward which requires the auspices of a steady system of national

policy.

But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminution of

attachment and reverence which steals into the hearts of the people,

towards a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity,

and disappoints so many of their flattering hopes. No government,

any more than an individual, will long be respected without being

truly respectable; nor be truly respectable, without possessing a

certain portion of order and stability.

PUBLIUS.