FEDERALIST No. 54

The Apportionment of Members Among the States

From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 12, 1788.

HAMILTON OR MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE next view which I shall take of the House of Representatives

relates to the appointment of its members to the several States

which is to be determined by the same rule with that of direct

taxes.

It is not contended that the number of people in each

State ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion

of those who are to represent the people of each State. The

establishment of the same rule for the appointment of taxes, will

probably be as little contested; though the rule itself in this

case, is by no means founded on the same principle. In the former

case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights of

the people, with which it has a natural and universal connection.

In the latter, it has reference to the proportion of wealth, of

which it is in no case a precise measure, and in ordinary cases a

very unfit one. But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule

as applied to the relative wealth and contributions of the

States, it is evidently the least objectionable among the

practicable rules, and had too recently obtained the general

sanction of America, not to have found a ready preference with

the convention. All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said;

but does it follow, from an admission of numbers for the measure

of representation, or of slaves combined with free citizens as a

ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to be included in the

numerical rule of representation? Slaves are considered as

property, not as persons. They ought therefore to be comprehended

in estimates of taxation which are founded on property, and to be

excluded from representation which is regulated by a census of

persons. This is the objection, as I understand it, stated in its

full force. I shall be equally candid in stating the reasoning

which may be offered on the opposite side. ``We subscribe to the

doctrine,'' might one of our Southern brethren observe, ``that

representation relates more immediately to persons, and taxation

more immediately to property, and we join in the application of

this distinction to the case of our slaves. But we must deny the

fact, that slaves are considered merely as property, and in no

respect whatever as persons. The true state of the case is, that

they partake of both these qualities: being considered by our

laws, in some respects, as persons, and in other respects as

property. In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for

a master; in being vendible by one master to another master; and

in being subject at all times to be restrained in his liberty and

chastised in his body, by the capricious will of another, the

slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank, and classed

with those irrational animals which fall under the legal

denomination of property. In being protected, on the other hand,

in his life and in his limbs, against the violence of all

others, even the master of his labor and his liberty; and in

being punishable himself for all violence committed against

others, the slave is no less evidently regarded by the law as a

member of the society, not as a part of the irrational creation;

as a moral person, not as a mere article of property. The

federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great propriety on

the case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixed character

of persons and of property. This is in fact their true

character. It is the character bestowed on them by the laws

under which they live; and it will not be denied, that these are

the proper criterion; because it is only under the pretext that

the laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of property,

that a place is disputed them in the computation of numbers; and

it is admitted, that if the laws were to restore the rights which

have been taken away, the negroes could no longer be refused an

equal share of representation with the other inhabitants. ``This

question may be placed in another light. It is agreed on all

sides, that numbers are the best scale of wealth and taxation, as

they are the only proper scale of representation. Would the

convention have been impartial or consistent, if they had

rejected the slaves from the list of inhabitants, when the shares

of representation were to be calculated, and inserted them on the

lists when the tariff of contributions was to be adjusted? Could

it be reasonably expected, that the Southern States would concur

in a system, which considered their slaves in some degree as men,

when burdens were to be imposed, but refused to consider them in

the same light, when advantages were to be conferred? Might not

some surprise also be expressed, that those who reproach the

Southern States with the barbarous policy of considering as

property a part of their human brethren, should themselves

contend, that the government to which all the States are to be

parties, ought to consider this unfortunate race more completely

in the unnatural light of property, than the very laws of which

they complain? ``It may be replied, perhaps, that slaves are not

included in the estimate of representatives in any of the States

possessing them. They neither vote themselves nor increase the

votes of their masters. Upon what principle, then, ought they to

be taken into the federal estimate of representation? In

rejecting them altogether, the Constitution would, in this

respect, have followed the very laws which have been appealed to

as the proper guide. ``This objection is repelled by a single

abservation. It is a fundamental principle of the proposed

Constitution, that as the aggregate number of representatives

allotted to the several States is to be determined by a federal

rule, founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants, so the

right of choosing this allotted number in each State is to be

exercised by such part of the inhabitants as the State itself may

designate. The qualifications on which the right of suffrage

depend are not, perhaps, the same in any two States. In some of

the States the difference is very material. In every State, a

certain proportion of inhabitants are deprived of this right by

the constitution of the State, who will be included in the census

by which the federal Constitution apportions the representatives.

In this point of view the Southern States might retort the

complaint, by insisting that the principle laid down by the

convention required that no regard should be had to the policy of

particular States towards their own inhabitants; and

consequently, that the slaves, as inhabitants, should have been

admitted into the census according to their full number, in like

manner with other inhabitants, who, by the policy of other

States, are not admitted to all the rights of citizens. A

rigorous adherence, however, to this principle, is waived by

those who would be gainers by it. All that they ask is that

equal moderation be shown on the other side. Let the case of the

slaves be considered, as it is in truth, a peculiar one. Let the

compromising expedient of the Constitution be mutually adopted,

which regards them as inhabitants, but as debased by servitude

below the equal level of free inhabitants, which regards the

SLAVE as divested of two fifths of the MAN. ``After all, may not

another ground be taken on which this article of the

Constitution will admit of a still more ready defense? We have

hitherto proceeded on the idea that representation related to

persons only, and not at all to property. But is it a just idea?

Government is instituted no less for protection of the property,

than of the persons, of individuals. The one as well as the

other, therefore, may be considered as represented by those who

are charged with the government. Upon this principle it is, that

in several of the States, and particularly in the State of New

York, one branch of the government is intended more especially to

be the guardian of property, and is accordingly elected by that

part of the society which is most interested in this object of

government. In the federal Constitution, this policy does not

prevail. The rights of property are committed into the same hands

with the personal rights. Some attention ought, therefore, to be

paid to property in the choice of those hands. ``For another

reason, the votes allowed in the federal legislature to the

people of each State, ought to bear some proportion to the

comparative wealth of the States. States have not, like

individuals, an influence over each other, arising from superior

advantages of fortune. If the law allows an opulent citizen but a

single vote in the choice of his representative, the respect and

consequence which he derives from his fortunate situation very

frequently guide the votes of others to the objects of his

choice; and through this imperceptible channel the rights of

property are conveyed into the public representation. A State

possesses no such influence over other States. It is not probable

that the richest State in the Confederacy will ever influence the

choice of a single representative in any other State. Nor will

the representatives of the larger and richer States possess any

other advantage in the federal legislature, over the

representatives of other States, than what may result from their

superior number alone. As far, therefore, as their superior

wealth and weight may justly entitle them to any advantage, it

ought to be secured to them by a superior share of

representation. The new Constitution is, in this respect,

materially different from the existing Confederation, as well as

from that of the United Netherlands, and other similar

confederacies. In each of the latter, the efficacy of the

federal resolutions depends on the subsequent and voluntary

resolutions of the states composing the union. Hence the states,

though possessing an equal vote in the public councils, have an

unequal influence, corresponding with the unequal importance of

these subsequent and voluntary resolutions. Under the proposed

Constitution, the federal acts will take effect without the

necessary intervention of the individual States. They will depend

merely on the majority of votes in the federal legislature, and

consequently each vote, whether proceeding from a larger or

smaller State, or a State more or less wealthy or powerful, will

have an equal weight and efficacy: in the same manner as the

votes individually given in a State legislature, by the

representatives of unequal counties or other districts, have

each a precise equality of value and effect; or if there be any

difference in the case, it proceeds from the difference in the

personal character of the individual representative, rather than

from any regard to the extent of the district from which he

comes. ''Such is the reasoning which an advocate for the

Southern interests might employ on this subject; and although it

may appear to be a little strained in some points, yet, on the

whole, I must confess that it fully reconciles me to the scale of

representation which the convention have established. In one

respect, the establishment of a common measure for representation

and taxation will have a very salutary effect. As the accuracy

of the census to be obtained by the Congress will necessarily

depend, in a considerable degree on the disposition, if not on

the co-operation, of the States, it is of great importance that

the States should feel as little bias as possible, to swell or to

reduce the amount of their numbers. Were their share of

representation alone to be governed by this rule, they would have

an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants. Were the rule to

decide their share of taxation alone, a contrary temptation would

prevail. By extending the rule to both objects, the States will

have opposite interests, which will control and balance each

other, and produce the requisite impartiality. PUBLIUS.