FEDERALIST No. 4

The Same Subject Continued

(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)

For the Independent Journal.

JAY

To the People of the State of New York:

MY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the

people would be best secured by union against the danger it may be

exposed to by JUST causes of war given to other nations; and those

reasons show that such causes would not only be more rarely given,

but would also be more easily accommodated, by a national government

than either by the State governments or the proposed little

confederacies.

But the safety of the people of America against dangers from

FOREIGN force depends not only on their forbearing to give JUST

causes of war to other nations, but also on their placing and

continuing themselves in such a situation as not to INVITE hostility

or insult; for it need not be observed that there are PRETENDED as

well as just causes of war.

It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature,

that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect

of getting anything by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make

war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for the

purposes and objects merely personal, such as thirst for military

glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts

to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans.

These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of

the sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by

justice or the voice and interests of his people. But, independent

of these inducements to war, which are more prevalent in absolute

monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there are others

which affect nations as often as kings; and some of them will on

examination be found to grow out of our relative situation and

circumstances.

With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and

can supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves,

notwithstanding any efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own

or duties on foreign fish.

With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in

navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves

if we suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish;

for, as our carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree

diminishing theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more

their policy, to restrain than to promote it.

In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one

nation, inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which

they had in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves

with commodities which we used to purchase from them.

The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give

pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this

continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our productions,

added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and

address of our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater

share in the advantages which those territories afford, than

consists with the wishes or policy of their respective sovereigns.

Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on

the one side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the

other; nor will either of them permit the other waters which are

between them and us to become the means of mutual intercourse and

traffic.

From these and such like considerations, which might, if

consistent with prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy

to see that jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the

minds and cabinets of other nations, and that we are not to expect

that they should regard our advancement in union, in power and

consequence by land and by sea, with an eye of indifference and

composure.

The people of America are aware that inducements to war may

arise out of these circumstances, as well as from others not so

obvious at present, and that whenever such inducements may find fit

time and opportunity for operation, pretenses to color and justify

them will not be wanting. Wisely, therefore, do they consider union

and a good national government as necessary to put and keep them in

SUCH A SITUATION as, instead of INVITING war, will tend to repress

and discourage it. That situation consists in the best possibley

state of defense, and necessarily depends on the government, the

arms, and the resources of the country.

As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and

cannot be provided for without government, either one or more or

many, let us inquire whether one good government is not, relative to

the object in question, more competent than any other given number

whatever.

One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and

experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may

be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can

harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members,

and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In

the formation of treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole,

and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of

the whole. It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the

defense of any particular part, and that more easily and

expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies can

possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. It can place

the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by putting their

officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief Magistrate,

will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby

render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into

three or four distinct independent companies.

What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia

obeyed the government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the

government of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the

government of Wales? Suppose an invasion; would those three

governments (if they agreed at all) be able, with all their

respective forces, to operate against the enemy so effectually as

the single government of Great Britain would?

We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may

come, if we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage

attention. But if one national government, had not so regulated the

navigation of Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen--if one

national government had not called forth all the national means and

materials for forming fleets, their prowess and their thunder would

never have been celebrated. Let England have its navigation and

fleet--let Scotland have its navigation and fleet--let Wales have its

navigation and fleet--let Ireland have its navigation and fleet--let

those four of the constituent parts of the British empire be be

under four independent governments, and it is easy to perceive how

soon they would each dwindle into comparative insignificance.

Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into

thirteen or, if you please, into three or four independent

governments--what armies could they raise and pay--what fleets could

they ever hope to have? If one was attacked, would the others fly

to its succor, and spend their blood and money in its defense?

Would there be no danger of their being flattered into neutrality

by its specious promises, or seduced by a too great fondness for

peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity and present safety for

the sake of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have been jealous, and

whose importance they are content to see diminished? Although such

conduct would not be wise, it would, nevertheless, be natural. The

history of the states of Greece, and of other countries, abounds

with such instances, and it is not improbable that what has so often

happened would, under similar circumstances, happen again.

But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State

or confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion shall aids of

men and money be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies, and

from which of them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle

the terms of peace, and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide

between them and compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and

inconveniences would be inseparable from such a situation; whereas

one government, watching over the general and common interests, and

combining and directing the powers and resources of the whole, would

be free from all these embarrassments, and conduce far more to the

safety of the people.

But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under

one national government, or split into a number of confederacies,

certain it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as

it is; and they will act toward us accordingly. If they see that

our national government is efficient and well administered, our

trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and

disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our

credit re-established, our people free, contented, and united, they

will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke

our resentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either

destitute of an effectual government (each State doing right or

wrong, as to its rulers may seem convenient), or split into three or

four independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies,

one inclining to Britain, another to France, and a third to Spain,

and perhaps played off against each other by the three, what a poor,

pitiful figure will America make in their eyes! How liable would

she become not only to their contempt but to their outrage, and how

soon would dear-bought experience proclaim that when a people or

family so divide, it never fails to be against themselves.

PUBLIUS.