FEDERALIST No. 3

The Same Subject Continued

(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)

For the Independent Journal.

JAY

To the People of the State of New York:

IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if,

like the Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and

steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting

their interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great

respect for the high opinion which the people of America have so

long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing

firmly united under one federal government, vested with sufficient

powers for all general and national purposes.

The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons

which appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become

convinced that they are cogent and conclusive.

Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it

necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their

SAFETY seems to be the first. The SAFETY of the people doubtless

has relation to a great variety of circumstances and considerations,

and consequently affords great latitude to those who wish to define

it precisely and comprehensively.

At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security

for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against

dangers from FOREIGN ARMS AND INFLUENCE, as from dangers of the LIKE

KIND arising from domestic causes. As the former of these comes

first in order, it is proper it should be the first discussed. Let

us therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not right in

their opinion that a cordial Union, under an efficient national

government, affords them the best security that can be devised

against HOSTILITIES from abroad.

The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the

world will always be found to be in proportion to the number and

weight of the causes, whether REAL or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or

INVITE them. If this remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire

whether so many JUST causes of war are likely to be given by UNITED

AMERICA as by DISUNITED America; for if it should turn out that

United America will probably give the fewest, then it will follow

that in this respect the Union tends most to preserve the people in

a state of peace with other nations.

The JUST causes of war, for the most part, arise either from

violation of treaties or from direct violence. America has already

formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of

them, except Prussia, are maritime, and therefore able to annoy and

injure us. She has also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain,

and Britain, and, with respect to the two latter, has, in addition,

the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to.

It is of high importance to the peace of America that she

observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it

appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done

by one national government than it could be either by thirteen

separate States or by three or four distinct confederacies.

Because when once an efficient national government is

established, the best men in the country will not only consent to

serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage it; for,

although town or country, or other contracted influence, may place

men in State assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or

executive departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for

talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men

to offices under the national government,--especially as it will have

the widest field for choice, and never experience that want of

proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the States. Hence,

it will result that the administration, the political counsels, and

the judicial decisions of the national government will be more wise,

systematical, and judicious than those of individual States, and

consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as

well as more SAFE with respect to us.

Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of

treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded

in one sense and executed in the same manner,--whereas, adjudications

on the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or

four confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and

that, as well from the variety of independent courts and judges

appointed by different and independent governments, as from the

different local laws and interests which may affect and influence

them. The wisdom of the convention, in committing such questions to

the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible

only to one national government, cannot be too much commended.

Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often

tempt the governing party in one or two States to swerve from good

faith and justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other

States, and consequently having little or no influence on the

national government, the temptation will be fruitless, and good

faith and justice be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace

with Britain adds great weight to this reasoning.

Because, even if the governing party in a State should be

disposed to resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may,

and commonly do, result from circumstances peculiar to the State,

and may affect a great number of the inhabitants, the governing

party may not always be able, if willing, to prevent the injustice

meditated, or to punish the aggressors. But the national

government, not being affected by those local circumstances, will

neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor want power or

inclination to prevent or punish its commission by others.

So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations

of treaties and the laws of nations afford JUST causes of war, they

are less to be apprehended under one general government than under

several lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the

SAFETY of the people.

As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and

unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good

national government affords vastly more security against dangers of

that sort than can be derived from any other quarter.

Because such violences are more frequently caused by the

passions and interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two

States than of the Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been

occasioned by aggressions of the present federal government, feeble

as it is; but there are several instances of Indian hostilities

having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual States,

who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses, have

given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.

The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering

on some States and not on others, naturally confines the causes of

quarrel more immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if

any, will be those who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and

a quick sense of apparent interest or injury, will be most likely,

by direct violence, to excite war with these nations; and nothing

can so effectually obviate that danger as a national government,

whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by the passions

which actuate the parties immediately interested.

But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the

national government, but it will also be more in their power to

accommodate and settle them amicably. They will be more temperate

and cool, and in that respect, as well as in others, will be more in

capacity to act advisedly than the offending State. The pride of

states, as well as of men, naturally disposes them to justify all

their actions, and opposes their acknowledging, correcting, or

repairing their errors and offenses. The national government, in

such cases, will not be affected by this pride, but will proceed

with moderation and candor to consider and decide on the means most

proper to extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them.

Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations,

and compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong

united nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered

by a State or confederacy of little consideration or power.

In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV.,

endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their

Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their

senators, to FRANCE, to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They

were obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace. Would he on any

occasion either have demanded or have received the like humiliation

from Spain, or Britain, or any other POWERFUL nation?

PUBLIUS.