FEDERALIST No. 17

The Same Subject Continued

(The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the

Union)

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

AN OBJECTION, of a nature different from that which has been

stated and answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise

urged against the principle of legislation for the individual

citizens of America. It may be said that it would tend to render

the government of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb

those residuary authorities, which it might be judged proper to

leave with the States for local purposes. Allowing the utmost

latitude to the love of power which any reasonable man can require,

I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons

intrusted with the administration of the general government could

ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that

description. The regulation of the mere domestic police of a State

appears to me to hold out slender allurements to ambition.

Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the

objects which have charms for minds governed by that passion; and

all the powers necessary to those objects ought, in the first

instance, to be lodged in the national depository. The

administration of private justice between the citizens of the same

State, the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a

similar nature, all those things, in short, which are proper to be

provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a

general jurisdiction. It is therefore improbable that there should

exist a disposition in the federal councils to usurp the powers with

which they are connected; because the attempt to exercise those

powers would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory; and the

possession of them, for that reason, would contribute nothing to the

dignity, to the importance, or to the splendor of the national

government.

But let it be admitted, for argument's sake, that mere

wantonness and lust of domination would be sufficient to beget that

disposition; still it may be safely affirmed, that the sense of the

constituent body of the national representatives, or, in other

words, the people of the several States, would control the

indulgence of so extravagant an appetite. It will always be far

more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the national

authorities than for the national government to encroach upon the

State authorities. The proof of this proposition turns upon the

greater degree of influence which the State governments if they

administer their affairs with uprightness and prudence, will

generally possess over the people; a circumstance which at the same

time teaches us that there is an inherent and intrinsic weakness in

all federal constitutions; and that too much pains cannot be taken

in their organization, to give them all the force which is

compatible with the principles of liberty.

The superiority of influence in favor of the particular

governments would result partly from the diffusive construction of

the national government, but chiefly from the nature of the objects

to which the attention of the State administrations would be

directed.

It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections are

commonly weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the

object. Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his

family than to his neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the

community at large, the people of each State would be apt to feel a

stronger bias towards their local governments than towards the

government of the Union; unless the force of that principle should

be destroyed by a much better administration of the latter.

This strong propensity of the human heart would find powerful

auxiliaries in the objects of State regulation.

The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily

fall under the superintendence of the local administrations, and

which will form so many rivulets of influence, running through every

part of the society, cannot be particularized, without involving a

detail too tedious and uninteresting to compensate for the

instruction it might afford.

There is one transcendant advantage belonging to the province of

the State governments, which alone suffices to place the matter in a

clear and satisfactory light,--I mean the ordinary administration of

criminal and civil justice. This, of all others, is the most

powerful, most universal, and most attractive source of popular

obedience and attachment. It is that which, being the immediate and

visible guardian of life and property, having its benefits and its

terrors in constant activity before the public eye, regulating all

those personal interests and familiar concerns to which the

sensibility of individuals is more immediately awake, contributes,

more than any other circumstance, to impressing upon the minds of

the people, affection, esteem, and reverence towards the government.

This great cement of society, which will diffuse itself almost

wholly through the channels of the particular governments,

independent of all other causes of influence, would insure them so

decided an empire over their respective citizens as to render them

at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not unfrequently,

dangerous rivals to the power of the Union.

The operations of the national government, on the other hand,

falling less immediately under the observation of the mass of the

citizens, the benefits derived from it will chiefly be perceived and

attended to by speculative men. Relating to more general interests,

they will be less apt to come home to the feelings of the people;

and, in proportion, less likely to inspire an habitual sense of

obligation, and an active sentiment of attachment.

The reasoning on this head has been abundantly exemplified by

the experience of all federal constitutions with which we are

acquainted, and of all others which have borne the least analogy to

them.

Though the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly speaking,

confederacies, yet they partook of the nature of that species of

association. There was a common head, chieftain, or sovereign,

whose authority extended over the whole nation; and a number of

subordinate vassals, or feudatories, who had large portions of land

allotted to them, and numerous trains of INFERIOR vassals or

retainers, who occupied and cultivated that land upon the tenure of

fealty or obedience, to the persons of whom they held it. Each

principal vassal was a kind of sovereign, within his particular

demesnes. The consequences of this situation were a continual

opposition to authority of the sovereign, and frequent wars between

the great barons or chief feudatories themselves. The power of the

head of the nation was commonly too weak, either to preserve the

public peace, or to protect the people against the oppressions of

their immediate lords. This period of European affairs is

emphatically styled by historians, the times of feudal anarchy.

When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and warlike

temper and of superior abilities, he would acquire a personal weight

and influence, which answered, for the time, the purpose of a more

regular authority. But in general, the power of the barons

triumphed over that of the prince; and in many instances his

dominion was entirely thrown off, and the great fiefs were erected

into independent principalities or States. In those instances in

which the monarch finally prevailed over his vassals, his success

was chiefly owing to the tyranny of those vassals over their

dependents. The barons, or nobles, equally the enemies of the

sovereign and the oppressors of the common people, were dreaded and

detested by both; till mutual danger and mutual interest effected a

union between them fatal to the power of the aristocracy. Had the

nobles, by a conduct of clemency and justice, preserved the fidelity

and devotion of their retainers and followers, the contests between

them and the prince must almost always have ended in their favor,

and in the abridgment or subversion of the royal authority.

This is not an assertion founded merely in speculation or

conjecture. Among other illustrations of its truth which might be

cited, Scotland will furnish a cogent example. The spirit of

clanship which was, at an early day, introduced into that kingdom,

uniting the nobles and their dependants by ties equivalent to those

of kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant overmatch for the

power of the monarch, till the incorporation with England subdued

its fierce and ungovernable spirit, and reduced it within those

rules of subordination which a more rational and more energetic

system of civil polity had previously established in the latter

kingdom.

The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be compared

with the feudal baronies; with this advantage in their favor, that

from the reasons already explained, they will generally possess the

confidence and good-will of the people, and with so important a

support, will be able effectually to oppose all encroachments of the

national government. It will be well if they are not able to

counteract its legitimate and necessary authority. The points of

similitude consist in the rivalship of power, applicable to both,

and in the CONCENTRATION of large portions of the strength of the

community into particular DEPOSITS, in one case at the disposal of

individuals, in the other case at the disposal of political bodies.

A concise review of the events that have attended confederate

governments will further illustrate this important doctrine; an

inattention to which has been the great source of our political

mistakes, and has given our jealousy a direction to the wrong side.

This review shall form the subject of some ensuing papers.

PUBLIUS.