FEDERALIST No. 15

The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the

Union

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York.

IN THE course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my

fellow-citizens, to place before you, in a clear and convincing

light, the importance of Union to your political safety and

happiness. I have unfolded to you a complication of dangers to

which you would be exposed, should you permit that sacred knot which

binds the people of America together be severed or dissolved by

ambition or by avarice, by jealousy or by misrepresentation. In the

sequel of the inquiry through which I propose to accompany you, the

truths intended to be inculcated will receive further confirmation

from facts and arguments hitherto unnoticed. If the road over which

you will still have to pass should in some places appear to you

tedious or irksome, you will recollect that you are in quest of

information on a subject the most momentous which can engage the

attention of a free people, that the field through which you have to

travel is in itself spacious, and that the difficulties of the

journey have been unnecessarily increased by the mazes with which

sophistry has beset the way. It will be my aim to remove the

obstacles from your progress in as compendious a manner as it can be

done, without sacrificing utility to despatch.

In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the

discussion of the subject, the point next in order to be examined is

the ``insufficiency of the present Confederation to the preservation

of the Union.'' It may perhaps be asked what need there is of

reasoning or proof to illustrate a position which is not either

controverted or doubted, to which the understandings and feelings of

all classes of men assent, and which in substance is admitted by the

opponents as well as by the friends of the new Constitution. It

must in truth be acknowledged that, however these may differ in

other respects, they in general appear to harmonize in this

sentiment, at least, that there are material imperfections in our

national system, and that something is necessary to be done to

rescue us from impending anarchy. The facts that support this

opinion are no longer objects of speculation. They have forced

themselves upon the sensibility of the people at large, and have at

length extorted from those, whose mistaken policy has had the

principal share in precipitating the extremity at which we are

arrived, a reluctant confession of the reality of those defects in

the scheme of our federal government, which have been long pointed

out and regretted by the intelligent friends of the Union.

We may indeed with propriety be said to have reached almost the

last stage of national humiliation. There is scarcely anything that

can wound the pride or degrade the character of an independent

nation which we do not experience. Are there engagements to the

performance of which we are held by every tie respectable among men?

These are the subjects of constant and unblushing violation. Do we

owe debts to foreigners and to our own citizens contracted in a time

of imminent peril for the preservation of our political existence?

These remain without any proper or satisfactory provision for their

discharge. Have we valuable territories and important posts in the

possession of a foreign power which, by express stipulations, ought

long since to have been surrendered? These are still retained, to

the prejudice of our interests, not less than of our rights. Are we

in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression? We have

neither troops, nor treasury, nor government.1 Are we even in a

condition to remonstrate with dignity? The just imputations on our

own faith, in respect to the same treaty, ought first to be removed.

Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free participation in

the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it. Is

public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger?

We seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable.

Is commerce of importance to national wealth? Ours is at the

lowest point of declension. Is respectability in the eyes of

foreign powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments? The

imbecility of our government even forbids them to treat with us.

Our ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty.

Is a violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom

of national distress? The price of improved land in most parts of

the country is much lower than can be accounted for by the quantity

of waste land at market, and can only be fully explained by that

want of private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly

prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct tendency to

depreciate property of every kind. Is private credit the friend and

patron of industry? That most useful kind which relates to

borrowing and lending is reduced within the narrowest limits, and

this still more from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity

of money. To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford

neither pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be demanded,

what indication is there of national disorder, poverty, and

insignificance that could befall a community so peculiarly blessed

with natural advantages as we are, which does not form a part of the

dark catalogue of our public misfortunes?

This is the melancholy situation to which we have been brought

by those very maxims and councils which would now deter us from

adopting the proposed Constitution; and which, not content with

having conducted us to the brink of a precipice, seem resolved to

plunge us into the abyss that awaits us below. Here, my countrymen,

impelled by every motive that ought to influence an enlightened

people, let us make a firm stand for our safety, our tranquillity,

our dignity, our reputation. Let us at last break the fatal charm

which has too long seduced us from the paths of felicity and

prosperity.

It is true, as has been before observed that facts, too stubborn

to be resisted, have produced a species of general assent to the

abstract proposition that there exist material defects in our

national system; but the usefulness of the concession, on the part

of the old adversaries of federal measures, is destroyed by a

strenuous opposition to a remedy, upon the only principles that can

give it a chance of success. While they admit that the government

of the United States is destitute of energy, they contend against

conferring upon it those powers which are requisite to supply that

energy. They seem still to aim at things repugnant and

irreconcilable; at an augmentation of federal authority, without a

diminution of State authority; at sovereignty in the Union, and

complete independence in the members. They still, in fine, seem to

cherish with blind devotion the political monster of an imperium

in imperio. This renders a full display of the principal defects

of the Confederation necessary, in order to show that the evils we

experience do not proceed from minute or partial imperfections, but

from fundamental errors in the structure of the building, which

cannot be amended otherwise than by an alteration in the first

principles and main pillars of the fabric.

The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing

Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or

GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as

contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of which they consist.

Though this principle does not run through all the powers delegated

to the Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the

efficacy of the rest depends. Except as to the rule of appointment,

the United States has an indefinite discretion to make requisitions

for men and money; but they have no authority to raise either, by

regulations extending to the individual citizens of America. The

consequence of this is, that though in theory their resolutions

concerning those objects are laws, constitutionally binding on the

members of the Union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations

which the States observe or disregard at their option.

It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human

mind, that after all the admonitions we have had from experience on

this head, there should still be found men who object to the new

Constitution, for deviating from a principle which has been found

the bane of the old, and which is in itself evidently incompatible

with the idea of GOVERNMENT; a principle, in short, which, if it is

to be executed at all, must substitute the violent and sanguinary

agency of the sword to the mild influence of the magistracy.

There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league

or alliance between independent nations for certain defined purposes

precisely stated in a treaty regulating all the details of time,

place, circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future

discretion; and depending for its execution on the good faith of

the parties. Compacts of this kind exist among all civilized

nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and war, of

observance and non-observance, as the interests or passions of the

contracting powers dictate. In the early part of the present

century there was an epidemical rage in Europe for this species of

compacts, from which the politicians of the times fondly hoped for

benefits which were never realized. With a view to establishing the

equilibrium of power and the peace of that part of the world, all

the resources of negotiation were exhausted, and triple and

quadruple alliances were formed; but they were scarcely formed

before they were broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson

to mankind, how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which

have no other sanction than the obligations of good faith, and which

oppose general considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of

any immediate interest or passion.

If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand

in a similar relation to each other, and to drop the project of a

general DISCRETIONARY SUPERINTENDENCE, the scheme would indeed be

pernicious, and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have

been enumerated under the first head; but it would have the merit

of being, at least, consistent and practicable Abandoning all views

towards a confederate government, this would bring us to a simple

alliance offensive and defensive; and would place us in a situation

to be alternate friends and enemies of each other, as our mutual

jealousies and rivalships, nourished by the intrigues of foreign

nations, should prescribe to us.

But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation;

if we still will adhere to the design of a national government, or,

which is the same thing, of a superintending power, under the

direction of a common council, we must resolve to incorporate into

our plan those ingredients which may be considered as forming the

characteristic difference between a league and a government; we

must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the

citizens, --the only proper objects of government.

Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to

the idea of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in

other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be

no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands

which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than

advice or recommendation. This penalty, whatever it may be, can

only be inflicted in two ways: by the agency of the courts and

ministers of justice, or by military force; by the COERCION of the

magistracy, or by the COERCION of arms. The first kind can

evidently apply only to men; the last kind must of necessity, be

employed against bodies politic, or communities, or States. It is

evident that there is no process of a court by which the observance

of the laws can, in the last resort, be enforced. Sentences may be

denounced against them for violations of their duty; but these

sentences can only be carried into execution by the sword. In an

association where the general authority is confined to the

collective bodies of the communities, that compose it, every breach

of the laws must involve a state of war; and military execution

must become the only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of

things can certainly not deserve the name of government, nor would

any prudent man choose to commit his happiness to it.

There was a time when we were told that breaches, by the States,

of the regulations of the federal authority were not to be expected;

that a sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of

the respective members, and would beget a full compliance with all

the constitutional requisitions of the Union. This language, at the

present day, would appear as wild as a great part of what we now

hear from the same quarter will be thought, when we shall have

received further lessons from that best oracle of wisdom, experience.

It at all times betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by which

human conduct is actuated, and belied the original inducements to

the establishment of civil power. Why has government been

instituted at all? Because the passions of men will not conform to

the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint. Has it been

found that bodies of men act with more rectitude or greater

disinterestedness than individuals? The contrary of this has been

inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of mankind; and

the inference is founded upon obvious reasons. Regard to reputation

has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad action is to

be divided among a number than when it is to fall singly upon one.

A spirit of faction, which is apt to mingle its poison in the

deliberations of all bodies of men, will often hurry the persons of

whom they are composed into improprieties and excesses, for which

they would blush in a private capacity.

In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of sovereign

power, an impatience of control, that disposes those who are

invested with the exercise of it, to look with an evil eye upon all

external attempts to restrain or direct its operations. From this

spirit it happens, that in every political association which is

formed upon the principle of uniting in a common interest a number

of lesser sovereignties, there will be found a kind of eccentric

tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs, by the operation of

which there will be a perpetual effort in each to fly off from the

common centre. This tendency is not difficult to be accounted for.

It has its origin in the love of power. Power controlled or

abridged is almost always the rival and enemy of that power by which

it is controlled or abridged. This simple proposition will teach us

how little reason there is to expect, that the persons intrusted

with the administration of the affairs of the particular members of

a confederacy will at all times be ready, with perfect good-humor,

and an unbiased regard to the public weal, to execute the

resolutions or decrees of the general authority. The reverse of

this results from the constitution of human nature.

If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacy cannot be

executed without the intervention of the particular administrations,

there will be little prospect of their being executed at all. The

rulers of the respective members, whether they have a constitutional

right to do it or not, will undertake to judge of the propriety of

the measures themselves. They will consider the conformity of the

thing proposed or required to their immediate interests or aims;

the momentary conveniences or inconveniences that would attend its

adoption. All this will be done; and in a spirit of interested and

suspicious scrutiny, without that knowledge of national

circumstances and reasons of state, which is essential to a right

judgment, and with that strong predilection in favor of local

objects, which can hardly fail to mislead the decision. The same

process must be repeated in every member of which the body is

constituted; and the execution of the plans, framed by the councils

of the whole, will always fluctuate on the discretion of the

ill-informed and prejudiced opinion of every part. Those who have

been conversant in the proceedings of popular assemblies; who have

seen how difficult it often is, where there is no exterior pressure

of circumstances, to bring them to harmonious resolutions on

important points, will readily conceive how impossible it must be to

induce a number of such assemblies, deliberating at a distance from

each other, at different times, and under different impressions,

long to co-operate in the same views and pursuits.

In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign

wills is requisite, under the Confederation, to the complete

execution of every important measure that proceeds from the Union.

It has happened as was to have been foreseen. The measures of the

Union have not been executed; the delinquencies of the States have,

step by step, matured themselves to an extreme, which has, at

length, arrested all the wheels of the national government, and

brought them to an awful stand. Congress at this time scarcely

possess the means of keeping up the forms of administration, till

the States can have time to agree upon a more substantial substitute

for the present shadow of a federal government. Things did not come

to this desperate extremity at once. The causes which have been

specified produced at first only unequal and disproportionate

degrees of compliance with the requisitions of the Union. The

greater deficiencies of some States furnished the pretext of example

and the temptation of interest to the complying, or to the least

delinquent States. Why should we do more in proportion than those

who are embarked with us in the same political voyage? Why should

we consent to bear more than our proper share of the common burden?

These were suggestions which human selfishness could not withstand,

and which even speculative men, who looked forward to remote

consequences, could not, without hesitation, combat. Each State,

yielding to the persuasive voice of immediate interest or

convenience, has successively withdrawn its support, till the frail

and tottering edifice seems ready to fall upon our heads, and to

crush us beneath its ruins.

PUBLIUS.

1 ``I mean for the Union.''