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FEDERALIST No. 13

Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

As CONNECTED with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety

consider that of economy. The money saved from one object may be

usefully applied to another, and there will be so much the less to

be drawn from the pockets of the people. If the States are united

under one government, there will be but one national civil list to

support; if they are divided into several confederacies, there will

be as many different national civil lists to be provided for--and

each of them, as to the principal departments, coextensive with that

which would be necessary for a government of the whole. The entire

separation of the States into thirteen unconnected sovereignties is

a project too extravagant and too replete with danger to have many

advocates. The ideas of men who speculate upon the dismemberment of

the empire seem generally turned toward three confederacies--one

consisting of the four Northern, another of the four Middle, and a

third of the five Southern States. There is little probability that

there would be a greater number. According to this distribution,

each confederacy would comprise an extent of territory larger than

that of the kingdom of Great Britain. No well-informed man will

suppose that the affairs of such a confederacy can be properly

regulated by a government less comprehensive in its organs or

institutions than that which has been proposed by the convention.

When the dimensions of a State attain to a certain magnitude, it

requires the same energy of government and the same forms of

administration which are requisite in one of much greater extent.

This idea admits not of precise demonstration, because there is no

rule by which we can measure the momentum of civil power necessary

to the government of any given number of individuals; but when we

consider that the island of Britain, nearly commensurate with each

of the supposed confederacies, contains about eight millions of

people, and when we reflect upon the degree of authority required to

direct the passions of so large a society to the public good, we

shall see no reason to doubt that the like portion of power would be

sufficient to perform the same task in a society far more numerous.

Civil power, properly organized and exerted, is capable of

diffusing its force to a very great extent; and can, in a manner,

reproduce itself in every part of a great empire by a judicious

arrangement of subordinate institutions.

The supposition that each confederacy into which the States

would be likely to be divided would require a government not less

comprehensive than the one proposed, will be strengthened by another

supposition, more probable than that which presents us with three

confederacies as the alternative to a general Union. If we attend

carefully to geographical and commercial considerations, in

conjunction with the habits and prejudices of the different States,

we shall be led to conclude that in case of disunion they will most

naturally league themselves under two governments. The four Eastern

States, from all the causes that form the links of national sympathy

and connection, may with certainty be expected to unite. New York,

situated as she is, would never be unwise enough to oppose a feeble

and unsupported flank to the weight of that confederacy. There are

other obvious reasons that would facilitate her accession to it.

New Jersey is too small a State to think of being a frontier, in

opposition to this still more powerful combination; nor do there

appear to be any obstacles to her admission into it. Even

Pennsylvania would have strong inducements to join the Northern

league. An active foreign commerce, on the basis of her own

navigation, is her true policy, and coincides with the opinions and

dispositions of her citizens. The more Southern States, from

various circumstances, may not think themselves much interested in

the encouragement of navigation. They may prefer a system which

would give unlimited scope to all nations to be the carriers as well

as the purchasers of their commodities. Pennsylvania may not choose

to confound her interests in a connection so adverse to her policy.

As she must at all events be a frontier, she may deem it most

consistent with her safety to have her exposed side turned towards

the weaker power of the Southern, rather than towards the stronger

power of the Northern, Confederacy. This would give her the fairest

chance to avoid being the Flanders of America. Whatever may be the

determination of Pennsylvania, if the Northern Confederacy includes

New Jersey, there is no likelihood of more than one confederacy to

the south of that State.

Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen States will

be able to support a national government better than one half, or

one third, or any number less than the whole. This reflection must

have great weight in obviating that objection to the proposed plan,

which is founded on the principle of expense; an objection,

however, which, when we come to take a nearer view of it, will

appear in every light to stand on mistaken ground.

If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil

lists, we take into view the number of persons who must necessarily

be employed to guard the inland communication between the different

confederacies against illicit trade, and who in time will infallibly

spring up out of the necessities of revenue; and if we also take

into view the military establishments which it has been shown would

unavoidably result from the jealousies and conflicts of the several

nations into which the States would be divided, we shall clearly

discover that a separation would be not less injurious to the

economy, than to the tranquillity, commerce, revenue, and liberty of

every part.

PUBLIUS.