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FEDERALIST No. 11

The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a

Navy

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of

those points about which there is least room to entertain a

difference of opinion, and which has, in fact, commanded the most

general assent of men who have any acquaintance with the subject.

This applies as well to our intercourse with foreign countries as

with each other.

There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the

adventurous spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of

America, has already excited uneasy sensations in several of the

maritime powers of Europe. They seem to be apprehensive of our too

great interference in that carrying trade, which is the support of

their navigation and the foundation of their naval strength. Those

of them which have colonies in America look forward to what this

country is capable of becoming, with painful solicitude. They

foresee the dangers that may threaten their American dominions from

the neighborhood of States, which have all the dispositions, and

would possess all the means, requisite to the creation of a powerful

marine. Impressions of this kind will naturally indicate the policy

of fostering divisions among us, and of depriving us, as far as

possible, of an ACTIVE COMMERCE in our own bottoms. This would

answer the threefold purpose of preventing our interference in their

navigation, of monopolizing the profits of our trade, and of

clipping the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness.

Did not prudence forbid the detail, it would not be difficult to

trace, by facts, the workings of this policy to the cabinets of

ministers.

If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so unfriendly

to our prosperity in a variety of ways. By prohibitory regulations,

extending, at the same time, throughout the States, we may oblige

foreign countries to bid against each other, for the privileges of

our markets. This assertion will not appear chimerical to those who

are able to appreciate the importance of the markets of three

millions of people--increasing in rapid progression, for the most

part exclusively addicted to agriculture, and likely from local

circumstances to remain so--to any manufacturing nation; and the

immense difference there would be to the trade and navigation of

such a nation, between a direct communication in its own ships, and

an indirect conveyance of its products and returns, to and from

America, in the ships of another country. Suppose, for instance, we

had a government in America, capable of excluding Great Britain

(with whom we have at present no treaty of commerce) from all our

ports; what would be the probable operation of this step upon her

politics? Would it not enable us to negotiate, with the fairest

prospect of success, for commercial privileges of the most valuable

and extensive kind, in the dominions of that kingdom? When these

questions have been asked, upon other occasions, they have received

a plausible, but not a solid or satisfactory answer. It has been

said that prohibitions on our part would produce no change in the

system of Britain, because she could prosecute her trade with us

through the medium of the Dutch, who would be her immediate

customers and paymasters for those articles which were wanted for

the supply of our markets. But would not her navigation be

materially injured by the loss of the important advantage of being

her own carrier in that trade? Would not the principal part of its

profits be intercepted by the Dutch, as a compensation for their

agency and risk? Would not the mere circumstance of freight

occasion a considerable deduction? Would not so circuitous an

intercourse facilitate the competitions of other nations, by

enhancing the price of British commodities in our markets, and by

transferring to other hands the management of this interesting

branch of the British commerce?

A mature consideration of the objects suggested by these

questions will justify a belief that the real disadvantages to

Britain from such a state of things, conspiring with the

pre-possessions of a great part of the nation in favor of the

American trade, and with the importunities of the West India

islands, would produce a relaxation in her present system, and would

let us into the enjoyment of privileges in the markets of those

islands elsewhere, from which our trade would derive the most

substantial benefits. Such a point gained from the British

government, and which could not be expected without an equivalent in

exemptions and immunities in our markets, would be likely to have a

correspondent effect on the conduct of other nations, who would not

be inclined to see themselves altogether supplanted in our trade.

A further resource for influencing the conduct of European

nations toward us, in this respect, would arise from the

establishment of a federal navy. There can be no doubt that the

continuance of the Union under an efficient government would put it

in our power, at a period not very distant, to create a navy which,

if it could not vie with those of the great maritime powers, would

at least be of respectable weight if thrown into the scale of either

of two contending parties. This would be more peculiarly the case

in relation to operations in the West Indies. A few ships of the

line, sent opportunely to the reinforcement of either side, would

often be sufficient to decide the fate of a campaign, on the event

of which interests of the greatest magnitude were suspended. Our

position is, in this respect, a most commanding one. And if to this

consideration we add that of the usefulness of supplies from this

country, in the prosecution of military operations in the West

Indies, it will readily be perceived that a situation so favorable

would enable us to bargain with great advantage for commercial

privileges. A price would be set not only upon our friendship, but

upon our neutrality. By a steady adherence to the Union we may

hope, erelong, to become the arbiter of Europe in America, and to be

able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part of

the world as our interest may dictate.

But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover

that the rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon each

other, and would frustrate all the tempting advantages which nature

has kindly placed within our reach. In a state so insignificant our

commerce would be a prey to the wanton intermeddlings of all nations

at war with each other; who, having nothing to fear from us, would

with little scruple or remorse, supply their wants by depredations

on our property as often as it fell in their way. The rights of

neutrality will only be respected when they are defended by an

adequate power. A nation, despicable by its weakness, forfeits even

the privilege of being neutral.

Under a vigorous national government, the natural strength and

resources of the country, directed to a common interest, would

baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our

growth. This situation would even take away the motive to such

combinations, by inducing an impracticability of success. An active

commerce, an extensive navigation, and a flourishing marine would

then be the offspring of moral and physical necessity. We might

defy the little arts of the little politicians to control or vary

the irresistible and unchangeable course of nature.

But in a state of disunion, these combinations might exist and

might operate with success. It would be in the power of the

maritime nations, availing themselves of our universal impotence, to

prescribe the conditions of our political existence; and as they

have a common interest in being our carriers, and still more in

preventing our becoming theirs, they would in all probability

combine to embarrass our navigation in such a manner as would in

effect destroy it, and confine us to a PASSIVE COMMERCE. We should

then be compelled to content ourselves with the first price of our

commodities, and to see the profits of our trade snatched from us to

enrich our enemies and p rsecutors. That unequaled spirit of

enterprise, which signalizes the genius of the American merchants

and navigators, and which is in itself an inexhaustible mine of

national wealth, would be stifled and lost, and poverty and disgrace

would overspread a country which, with wisdom, might make herself

the admiration and envy of the world.

There are rights of great moment to the trade of America which

are rights of the Union--I allude to the fisheries, to the navigation

of the Western lakes, and to that of the Mississippi. The

dissolution of the Confederacy would give room for delicate

questions concerning the future existence of these rights; which

the interest of more powerful partners would hardly fail to solve to

our disadvantage. The disposition of Spain with regard to the

Mississippi needs no comment. France and Britain are concerned with

us in the fisheries, and view them as of the utmost moment to their

navigation. They, of course, would hardly remain long indifferent

to that decided mastery, of which experience has shown us to be

possessed in this valuable branch of traffic, and by which we are

able to undersell those nations in their own markets. What more

natural than that they should be disposed to exclude from the lists

such dangerous competitors?

This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a partial

benefit. All the navigating States may, in different degrees,

advantageously participate in it, and under circumstances of a

greater extension of mercantile capital, would not be unlikely to do

it. As a nursery of seamen, it now is, or when time shall have more

nearly assimilated the principles of navigation in the several

States, will become, a universal resource. To the establishment of

a navy, it must be indispensable.

To this great national object, a NAVY, union will contribute in

various ways. Every institution will grow and flourish in

proportion to the quantity and extent of the means concentred

towards its formation and support. A navy of the United States, as

it would embrace the resources of all, is an object far less remote

than a navy of any single State or partial confederacy, which would

only embrace the resources of a single part. It happens, indeed,

that different portions of confederated America possess each some

peculiar advantage for this essential establishment. The more

southern States furnish in greater abundance certain kinds of naval

stores--tar, pitch, and turpentine. Their wood for the construction

of ships is also of a more solid and lasting texture. The

difference in the duration of the ships of which the navy might be

composed, if chiefly constructed of Southern wood, would be of

signal importance, either in the view of naval strength or of

national economy. Some of the Southern and of the Middle States

yield a greater plenty of iron, and of better quality. Seamen must

chiefly be drawn from the Northern hive. The necessity of naval

protection to external or maritime commerce does not require a

particular elucidation, no more than the conduciveness of that

species of commerce to the prosperity of a navy.

An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will

advance the trade of each by an interchange of their respective

productions, not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home,

but for exportation to foreign markets. The veins of commerce in

every part will be replenished, and will acquire additional motion

and vigor from a free circulation of the commodities of every part.

Commercial enterprise will have much greater scope, from the

diversity in the productions of different States. When the staple

of one fails from a bad harvest or unproductive crop, it can call to

its aid the staple of another. The variety, not less than the

value, of products for exportation contributes to the activity of

foreign commerce. It can be conducted upon much better terms with a

large number of materials of a given value than with a small number

of materials of the same value; arising from the competitions of

trade and from the fluctations of markets. Particular articles may

be in great demand at certain periods, and unsalable at others; but

if there be a variety of articles, it can scarcely happen that they

should all be at one time in the latter predicament, and on this

account the operations of the merchant would be less liable to any

considerable obstruction or stagnation. The speculative trader will

at once perceive the force of these observations, and will

acknowledge that the aggregate balance of the commerce of the United

States would bid fair to be much more favorable than that of the

thirteen States without union or with partial unions.

It may perhaps be replied to this, that whether the States are

united or disunited, there would still be an intimate intercourse

between them which would answer the same ends; this intercourse

would be fettered, interrupted, and narrowed by a multiplicity of

causes, which in the course of these papers have been amply detailed.

A unity of commercial, as well as political, interests, can only

result from a unity of government.

There are other points of view in which this subject might be

placed, of a striking and animating kind. But they would lead us

too far into the regions of futurity, and would involve topics not

proper for a newspaper discussion. I shall briefly observe, that

our situation invites and our interests prompt us to aim at an

ascendant in the system of American affairs. The world may

politically, as well as geographically, be divided into four parts,

each having a distinct set of interests. Unhappily for the other

three, Europe, by her arms and by her negotiations, by force and by

fraud, has, in different degrees, extended her dominion over them

all. Africa, Asia, and America, have successively felt her

domination. The superiority she has long maintained has tempted her

to plume herself as the Mistress of the World, and to consider the

rest of mankind as created for her benefit. Men admired as profound

philosophers have, in direct terms, attributed to her inhabitants a

physical superiority, and have gravely asserted that all animals,

and with them the human species, degenerate in America--that even

dogs cease to bark after having breathed awhile in our

atmosphere.1 Facts have too long supported these arrogant

pretensions of the Europeans. It belongs to us to vindicate the

honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother,

moderation. Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will will add

another victim to his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be the

instruments of European greatness! Let the thirteen States, bound

together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one

great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic

force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection

between the old and the new world!

PUBLIUS.

``Recherches philosophiques sur les Americains.''